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Abstract 
 
This Ph.D. dissertation is composed of three chapters, in which several dynamical 
aspects about several economic problems are analyzed. 
In the first chapter, entitled “Dynamical Stability in Repeated Games”, we propose 
a definition of dynamic stability that can be applied to repeated games. For this purpose, 
we extend the traditional theory by extending the infinite repetition of the stage game 
not only towards the future, but also towards the past. This allows the existence of 
stationary strategies and hence the possibility of dynamic stability. 
In the second chapter, entitled “On the Role of Educational Subsidies” we develop 
an overlapping generations model, and we analyze its properties concerning the steady 
state and the transitional dynamics. We also calibrate the model with data on several 
European countries, and we find that the optimal distribution of public expenses 
between research and development and educational subsidies should be changed 
towards the former in a majority of countries. 
Finally, in the chapter entitled “Inflationary Effects of a Monetary Union” we 
develop a model that formalizes the Balassa-Samuelson effect, and we analyze its 
existence both in economies with independent monetary policy and in economies 
belonging to a monetary union. We find that this effect should only appear in countries 
inside a monetary union. For countries with independent monetary policy, the sign of 
the effect is the opposite. We also analyze the effects of an enlargement concerning fast 
growing countries. We find that both the average inflation rate of the Union and the 
inflation rate of the old members would be reduced, whereas there are two opposite 
effects for the new countries: the change towards a less relaxed monetary policy and a 
money attraction effect. We find that for certain countries of a hypothetical enlargement 
of the Euro zone, the former effect dominates, so the inflation rate of the new members 
would also be reduced. 
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Abstract
A concept of dynamic stability in innitely repeated games with discounting
is presented. For this purpose, one modication of the available theory is
needed: we need to relax the assumption that the game starts in a given
period. Under this new framework, we propose stable strategies such that
a folk theorem with an additional stability requirement still holds. Under
these strategies, convergence to the long run outcome is achieved in a nite
number of periods, no matter what actions or deviations have been played
in the past. Hence, we suggest a way in which a player can build up his
reputation after a deviation.
JEL classication codes: C70, C72
Keywords: Repeated Games, Stability, Stable Strategies
1 Introduction
The dynamic features of repeated games have been analyzed in a number of
studies. If the same players play the same game repeatedly, then they can
choose their actions as a function of the history of what have been played.
This implies that dynamic programming tools can be used in this context.
This approach has been revealed as a very useful tool. One example of its
applications is the work by Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990).
A dynamic consequence of repeated games is that there can be equilibria
that do not imply to play a static Nash equilibrium (NE from now on) each
period. Players may choose in one period strategies which are di¤erent from
the static best response in order to induce, through the history, some kind
of play in the future. The natural question arises: What kind of actions
(di¤erent from the static NE) can be supported in a repeated game? The
folk theorems provide an answer for subgame perfect equilibria (SPE).1
Apart from some technical conditions, all action proles with an individually
rational static payo¤ can be supported as a SPE of an innitely repeated
game.
This result sometimes relies on the so-called trigger strategies. However,
the use of this type of strategies brings additional problems. For example, if
for whatever reason the history is slightly perturbed, the continuation path
induced by trigger strategies changes dramatically, switching from a path of
cooperation to a path of (usually) Nash reversion. Obviously, this cannot
satisfy any concept of dynamic stability, as we will see later. This lack of
dynamic stability is also present in other, more general, punishment schemes
used in the literature. Optimal punishment schemes, like those described in
Abreu (1998), are an example.
Against this background, we propose a concept of dynamic stability for
repeated games. The rst observation is that we need to modify the usual
theory in the following way: We need a game with no beginning. In other
words, it is often assumed that a repeated game has a rst period in which
the game has started. As a consequence, the history of the game is always of
a nite and increasing dimension. It will be seen that this fact brings some
problems for the question of dynamic stability. Hence, we propose a slightly
di¤erent framework: the game has no beginning, i.e. history is always of the
same (innite) dimension.
This modication allows us to dene stationary strategies, i.e. strategies
that can be represented by only one function relating the past history with
1See Fudenberg and Tirole(1991), section 5.1.2.
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the current action. Then, we will be able to dene our concept of dynamic
stability in repeated games.
Another step in the analysis is to see if the requirement of dynamic sta-
bility modies in a substantial way the set of possible outcomes in a repeated
game. Our approach here will be to show that the folk theorem also holds
when we require dynamic stability. The proof of the theorem is constructive,
since it yields the class of (stationary) strategies that can support a certain
outcome. These strategies have the property that, after a deviation, the
prole played each period converges again to the long run prole in a nite
number of periods.
The following additional remark concerning the necessity of games with no
beginning may be useful. As already pointed out, the strategies at any period
are functions of the history, under a dynamic programming approach. One
can interpret this history as the object that determines the reputation of both
players, because it summarizes all cooperations and defections conducted
by the players. But, if the game starts in a given period, nothing can be
said about the initial reputation by looking at the history, since in the rst
period the history is the empty set. Indeed, it is implicitly assumed that
play begins with full reputation, because strategies often recommend players
to cooperate in the rst period.2 The available theory is silent about how
this initial reputation is determined. Note that it is indiferent to make an
implicit assumption, or to say that we assume explicitly (and exogenously)
a certain degree of reputation at the beginning of the game: we are in both
cases analyzing the convergence for only one initial reputation. By contrast,
we make in this paper the complete exercise: we take all possible histories
in a given period for a game that has no starting period, and we check if the
strategies induce convergence for all these possible histories. In this way, we
are studying convergence for all initial reputations, whereas the traditional
analysis focuses only on one initial reputation.
Of course, this new approach is appropriate to study games with no be-
ginning. However, it should be clear that our motivation is not (only) to
study this class of games. In a game starting today, players need to x some
idea about the likelihood that their opponents will cooperate or not. Clearly,
we might do this by assuming some prior distribution over a set of possible
types of the opponent. The other possibility is to do what were doing here.
Take all possible histories of the game as if it would have no beginning. If the
equilibrium converges to certain prole for all of them, then it is clear that
this prole will be the long run outcome. This is precisely our denition of
2More precisely, the strategies that support a certain outcome usually start by choosing
in the rst period the prole to be supported.
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dynamic stability. With this approach, we avoid the use of stochastic tools.
Moreover, we obtain the additional result that following any deviation (or
mistake), the equilibrium will converge to the long run outcome again, and
in a nite number of periods. In this sense, our approach not only provides
a more precise3 answer to the question: why are we cooperating?, but
also answers the question: if we are not in a cooperative situation (maybe
because someone has deviated in the past), how can we reach it again?.
Finally, note that the main contributions of this paper are the proposed
denition of stability, the proposed stable strategies, the management of
initial conditions in a repeated game, and how players can build up again
their reputation after a deviation. The folk theorem is presented only as a
complementary result. Of course, the proof is very similar to standard proofs
of folk theorems in repeated games; it is just a matter of extending it to an
environment without starting period and with reversion to the cooperative
outcome.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review
of the existing theory of repeated games, and proposes the main denitions in
which the rest of the work is based, including the denition of a stable SPE.
Section 3 presents a theorem useful to characterize outcomes supportable as
a stable SPE. Section 4 analizes the memory requirements of the proposed
stable strategies and relate them to the theory on bounded recall. Finally,
concluding thoughts and possible extensions are presented in section 5.
1.1 Related Literature
Abreu (1988) argues that we can have a penalty greater than Nash reversion
(the penalty usually assumed in trigger strategies). In this paper we also use
a penalty greater than Nash reversion. In fact, we use a penalty worse than
(or equal to) the minmax, but only for a nite number of periods. On the
other hand, the penalty in Abreu (1988) is for an innite number of periods
(if there are no deviations in the punishment phase), and it is not worse than
the minmax.
There are some recent studies concerned with the size of the penalty.
Evans and Thomas (2001) use the concept of perturbed game to study re-
peated games and cooperation. They criticize the previous work by Aumann
and Sorin (1989) and Anderlini and Sabourian (1995), showing that the result
perturbation implies e¢ ciencycan be achieved only if there are draconian
penalties in the support of the perturbation, i.e. penalties designed to min-
3More precise in the sense that, under our framework, cooperation does not depend on
initial conditions in the long term.
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max a player almost all the time. We have the same concern. Even Nash
reversion is a very big penalty to be fully credible. By contrast, our stability
requirement ensures that penalty is at least limited in time.
The strategy presented below is related to at least two other strategies
proposed in the previous literature. Green and Porter (1984) present a strat-
egy that has a nite number of punishment periods. However, since their
model is of imperfect information, the punishment phase is dened as a
function of one observable variable (the price) that imperfectly reects the
actions of other players. Therefore, even when players do not deviate, the
observable variable sometimes induces the punishment phase. This occurs
when it falls below a trigger level, generating uctuations in the behavior of
players. Hence, this environment is not adequate to study stability issues; the
motivation is totally di¤erent. A similar strategy can be found in Piccione
(2002).
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) use in their theorem 5.4 a strategy with
three phases. One is the cooperative phase. If someone deviates, the game
goes to a nite punishment phase. However, at the end of this second phase
the play doesnt return to the cooperative phase. Instead, it goes to a third
phase with payo¤s between the other two. Therefore, the strategies do not
induce a convergent equilibrium path. Moreover, it is imposed exogenously
that play begins in the cooperative phase, which amounts to assume that
players begin the game with reputation.
Finally, Kalai and Stanford (1988) and related papers study the possible
implementation of strategies by nite automata. At rst glance, one can in-
terpret this approach as a concern about stationarity of strategies. However,
this is only one requirement of our denition of stability (the other is con-
vergence). Moreover, we think that their automata do not cover stationarity
issues properly, because they assume that automata start the game in some
initial state of mindand, as already discussed, this initial assumption is not
innocuous. The same can be said about Kalai, Samet and Stanford (1988),
with the addition that they show that reactive equilibria can exist only by
chance, i.e. under a particular combination of parameters of measure zero.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we start with some basic concepts to be used. Then, we
modify the concept of a repeated game with an initial period or node to
dene a repeated game without initial period. Finally, we dene the concept
of stable subgame perfect equilibrium.
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2.1 Stage Game
Lets dene the following symmetric game, which will be called the stage
game. There are two players. Both of them must play an action simulta-
neously from the same set of possible actions. This set can be discrete or
continuous, nite or innite. Lets call this set S. The particular choices of
the two players will be denoted by s1; s2 2 S. Lets dene the instantaneous
payo¤ function for player i, ui as follows:
ui : S  S ! R
Where the rst argument in both payo¤ functions is the action of player
1 and the second the action of player 2. Each player is trying to maximize
his own payo¤.
Assumption A1: The functions ui are bounded, and the (static) best re-
sponse correspondences BRi (s i) = argmax
si
ui (s1; s2) are non-empty
valued.
2.2 Repeated Game
We construct a new game by the innite iteration of the stage game dened
before, in which past actions are observable. Now the objective function is
the sum of the instantaneous payo¤ functions, discounted by the parameter
, which is the same for both players. It is usual in the literature to assume
that the repeated game starts in a given period and continues up to innity.
Later we modify this concept using a repeated game that goes from minus
innity up to innity. To facilitate comparison between the two concepts we
present here some denitions about a repeated game with starting node.
Lets call period 0 the rst stage game, period 1 the second stage game,
and so on.
It is useful to dene the object historyin period t as the actions played
by both players in previous periods, and period t itself: ht = fhtkgtk=0 ;htk =
h1;tk ; h
2;t
k
	
. Denote the set of all possible histories at t by H t.
Now we can dene a strategy for player i in this repeated game as follows:
Denition 1 A strategy i for player i in the repeated game with starting
node is a sequence of functions, one for each t 2 f1; 2; : : :g of the form
sti : H
t 1 ! S, and an action s0i 2 S for period 0.
Note that the set H t 1 = (S  S)t varies with t.
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In each subgame ht 1, the strategies 1 and 2 determine a sequence of
pairs of actions, or continuation path, composed of the actions that players
would play if they followed the strategies 1 and 2 after history ht 1. Let
P (ht 1; 1; 2) = fPk (ht 1; 1; 2)g1k=0 be the combination of a given history
and its associated continuation path given 1 and 2. It can be dened in
the following recursive manner:
Pk
 
ht 1; 1; 2

=
(
ht 1k if k  t  1n
sk1(fPm (ht 1; 1; 2)gk 1m=0); sk2(fPm (ht 1; 1; 2)gk 1m=0)
o
if k  t
A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) can be dened in the following way:
Denition 2 A pair of strategies f1; 2g = fst1; st2g1t=0 constitute a SPE
of the discounted repeated game with starting node if, for all periods t 2
f0; 1; : : :g, and for all histories ht 1 2 H t 1 in each period, the following two
conditions are satised:
1X
k=t
k tu1
 
Pk
 
ht 1; 1; 2
  1X
k=t
k tu1
 
Pk
 
ht 1; ~1; 2

;8~1 6= 1
1X
k=t
k tu2
 
Pk
 
ht 1; 1; 2
  1X
k=t
k tu2
 
Pk
 
ht 1; 1; ~2

;8~2 6= 2
Now we can focus on the repeated game without starting node. In this
case history in period t is ht = fhtkgtk= 1.4 Note that here we need to include
all periods up to minus innity, since there is no starting node. Looking at
the denition of ht, it is clear that the set of all possible histories is now the
same for all periods: ht 2 H, where H = (S  S)1.
The denition of a strategy and of an equilibrium are very similar to the
previous ones:
Denition 3 A strategy i for player i in the repeated game without starting
node is a sequence of functions, one for each t 2 f: : : ; 1; 0; 1; : : :g of the
form sti : H ! S.
Denition 4 A pair of strategies f1; 2g = fst1; st2g1t= 1 constitute a SPE
of the discounted repeated game without starting node if, for all periods t 2
4The number of periods in P
 
ht 1; 1; 2

also changes, so now the continuation path
is P
 
ht 1; 1; 2

=

Pk
 
ht 1; 1; 2
	1
k= 1 with the same recursive denition exposed
above.
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f: : : ; 1; 0; 1; : : :g, and for all histories ht 1 2 H in each period, the following
two conditions are satised:
1X
k=t
k tu1
 
Pk
 
ht 1; 1; 2
  1X
k=t
k tu1
 
Pk
 
ht 1; ~1; 2

;8~1 6= 1
1X
k=t
k tu2
 
Pk
 
ht 1; 1; 2
  1X
k=t
k tu2
 
Pk
 
ht 1; 1; ~2

;8~2 6= 2
Note that in both cases we have an innite countable set of conditions
to be checked with an innite countable set of functions that constitute the
strategies.
In the traditional repeated games with initial node we have a very well
dened utility function for the whole game (which is usually assumed to
be additively separable over time). When we extend the model to cover a
repeated game with no beginning, this is no longer true. But this is not
a problem for denitions 3 and 4, as long as we keep the assumption of
separability over time of utility functions. With this assumption, the payo¤
function of each player at each period is dened conditionally, and therefore
the optimization problems are well dened, and deviations can be analysed
exactly in the same way as in a game with initial period.
2.3 Stationary Strategies and Stable Equilibria
Once we have dened an equilibrium for both cases (with and without initial
period), the next step is to dene stationary strategies.
Denition 5 A strategy i for the repeated game is stationary if there is a
function si such that sti = si;8t.
It is interesting to note that the concept of stationary strategies is not
applicable to a repeated game with initial period,5 because the functions sti
are dened over di¤erent sets (H t) for di¤erent periods. Contrariwise, when
there is no initial node, all functions sti are dened over the same set (H),
so it is possible to have stationary strategies. Here we have one advantage
of our approach: it is possible to study stationary strategies, and this fact
can simplify the analysis. Note that with stationary strategies, we do not
need to check deviations in all periods in all histories. Instead, it is enough
to x one period t, and analyze deviations in all histories or subgames ht,
5This is true unless the strategy is independent of history for all periods. If this is the
case, we can only have as equilibrium one NE of the stage game every period.
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but only for this period, because the only di¤erence between two subgames
is the previous history, not the period itself.
Now consider the continuation path P (ht; 1; 2) = fPk (ht; 1; 2)g1k= 1
determined by the strategies 1 and 2 given the history ht, dened above.
The denition of a dynamically stable SPE is the following:
Denition 6 A subgame perfect equilibrium for a repeated game with no
starting node satises dynamic stability if the following two conditions are
satised:
(a) Stationarity: The strategies 1 and 2 are stationary.
(b) Convergence: lim
k!1
Pk (h
t; 1; 2) = lim
k!1
Pk

~ht; 1; 2

;8ht; ~ht 2 H
Condition (b) in the previous denition states that in a stable SPE, the
continuation path converges to the same prole for all histories. Conse-
quently, the long run payo¤ for player i, ui

lim
k!1
Pk (h
t; 1; 2)

, does not
depend on the history.
Since the denitions of stationarity and stability cannot be applied to
repeated games with initial period, the next section focuses only on repeated
games with no starting period.
Now, we can investigate the existence of a stable SPE. For this purpose we
cannot rely on the traditional arguments of existence of NE in each subgame,
because we are focusing on pure strategy equilibria. Existence, however,
can be obtained if there is at least one NE in pure strategies of the stage
game. This is true because the strategies play the static NE in each period,
regardless of history are always a stable SPE. In order to obtain a more
general existence result, we should have a denition of dynamic stability also
for mixed strategies, which is beyond the scope of this paper.6
3 Outcomes supportable as a stable subgame
perfect equilibrium
In this section we present a folk theorem with an additional stability re-
quirement. We start by dening the minmax value in pure strategies for
player 1, v = min
s2
max
s1
u1 (s1; s2). Since, for simplicity, we are focusing on
symmetric games, this is also the minmax value in pure strategies for player
2. Let m = fm1;m2g be one strategy prole in which this minmax value is
attained for player 1. Again by symmetry, minmax for player 2 is attained
6Some comments about mixed strategies can be found in the concluding section.
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at fm2;m1g. Suppose we want to support a certain outcome fc1; c2g, and
for simplicity assume c1 = c2 = c. We will make two more simplifying as-
sumptions. Later on we will suggest how they can be relaxed. The rst one
is:
Assumption A2: 9p such that m2 2 argmax
s
u1 (s; p).
Take p according to the previous assumption, and take q = m2. Normalize
u1 (p; q) = u2(q; p) = 0. Then it should be clear that v  0. Furthermore,
under assumption A2, q is the (static) best response to p, so u1 (q; p) =
u2 (p; q)  v  0. Another simplifying assumption is:
Assumption A3: p 6= c, q 6= c.
The three following subsections are as follows. The rst presents the type
of strategies that will be used in the proof of the folk theorem, which is
presented in the second subsection. Finally, we study how long can be the
punishment interval T that follows a deviation for a given value of .
3.1 Strategies
Our strategy of proof is to support a certain outcome fc1; c2g, by imposing a
penalty of T periods in the case of a deviation, in which the deviating player
receives a payo¤ smaller than or equal to v. As stated above, it is assumed
for simplicity that this outcome is such that c1 = c2 = c.
The intuition of the strategy that is going to be used to support the
outcome is very simple. In fact, the strategy can be dened very easily in
the case of an initial period in the following way. Start in the cooperative
phase, with the two players playing c. If player 1 deviates, switch to phase
1, and if player 2 deviates, switch to phase 2. In phase 1, the prescribed
prole is fp; qg. The game remains in this phase until fp; qg is observed
for T consecutive periods, in which case the game switches again to the
cooperative phase, or until a deviation occurs, in which case a penalty to the
deviating player starts again. The same for phase 2, but with a prescribed
prole fq; pg.
The problem, however, arises when there is no initial node, since we
cannot impose a given phase at the start of the game. The alternative is
to dene the phase as a function of the previous history. Also, we need
strategies to be independent of calendar time, by stationarity.
We will present now the strategy in a formal way. It is very similar to
the one just described for games with initial period. First, we try to nd
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a suitable starting point in history (), and then we use j to record the
phase in which the game was in period j >  . The expression I (A) denotes
a function that takes the value 1 if the condition A is true, and 0 otherwise.
The strategy for player 1 with T periods of punishment is as follows:7
Step 1: Analyze previous history h 1. If
P 1
j= 1 I
 
h 1j = fc; cg
  1,
then take  = max

k : h 1k = fc; cg
	
, initialize +1 = 0, and go to step 2. IfP 1
j= 1 I
 
h 1k = fc; cg

= 0 and
P 1
j= 1
 
I
 
h1; 1j = c

+ I
 
h2; 1j = c
  2,
then take  = max
n
k < 0 :
P 1
j=k
 
I
 
h1; 1j = c

+ I
 
h2; 1j = c

= 2
o
, and
initialize +1 = 1 if h2; 1 = c, and +1 = 2 if h
1; 1
 = c, and go to step 2. IfP 1
j= 1 I
 
h 1j = fc; cg

= 0 and
P 1
j= 1
 
I
 
h1; 1j = c

+ I
 
h2; 1j = c

= 1,
then take  =

k : I
 
h1; 1k = c

+ I
 
h2; 1k = c

= 1
	
, and initialize +1 =
1 if h2; 1 = c, and +1 = 2 if h
1; 1
 = c, and go to step 2. Finally, ifP 1
j= 1
 
I
 
h1; 1j = c

+ I
 
h2; 1j = c

= 0, then initialize 0 = 0 and go to
step 3.
Step 2: If  + 1 = 0, then go to step 3. If not, compute +2 as follows.
If +1 = 0 and h 1+1 = fc; cg or both arguments are di¤erent from c, then
+2 = 0. If +1 = 0 and h
i; 1
+1 6= c; h i; 1+1 = c, then +2 = i. If +1 = 1,
then if h 1k = fp; qg ;8k 2 f + 2  T; : : : ;  + 1g, +2 = 0, else +2 = i,
where i is 1 unless h1; 1+1 = p and h
2; 1
+1 6= q, in which case i = 2. If +1 = 2,
then if h 1k = fq; pg ;8k 2 f + 2  T; : : : ;  + 1g, +2 = 0, else +2 = i,
where i is 2 unless h2; 1+1 = p and h
1; 1
+1 6= q in which case i = 1. Iterate until
0 is computed.
Step 3: If 0 = 0, then play c. If 0 = 1, then play p. If 0 = 2, then play
q.
Note that the previous maxima always exist because, at any given point,
the history nishes in the previous period.
As anticipated above, the variable  can be interpreted as the phase in
which the game is. Note that it is only used to determine the action to be
played, with no other future e¤ects. The strategy is presented in this way to
avoid confusion between imposing a particular phase in a particular period,
and determining the phase in one period endogenously. This is done in step
1. In step 2 we analyze deviations from cooperation, or from a punishment
phase, that have been occurred in the past, to be sure that at each time we
know who is the player that has deviated most recently. In step 3 we simply
require the players to play according to the current phase, which has been
determined in the two previous steps. It is worth noting that we need to do
the three steps at each period. Formally, it is not possible to make them once
7We assume that period is equal to 0 without loss of generality, by stationarity of the
strategy. Also, only strategy for player 1 is presented, by symmetry.
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and then follow the argument at the beginning of this subsection for games
with initial period (because we require stationarity), although the intuition
is similar.
3.2 The folk theorem
The proof of the following folk theorem for stable equilibria is quite standard,
and hence we will only focus on the steps needed to fulll the new stability
requirement (for further details see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
Theorem 7 Suppose we have a stage game in normal form satisfying as-
sumption A1, and consider the associated repeated game with no initial pe-
riod. Then (a) 9 2 (0; 1) such that, for all  2 ; 1, every pure strategy
prole with payo¤s greater than the minmax values can be the limit of the
equilibrium path of a stable SPE, for all histories; and (b) for all  2 ; 1,
convergence to this limit can be achieved in a nite number of periods, for all
histories.
Proof. Part (b) is done in detail in the following subsection. For simplicity,
the proof will make use of assumptions (A2) and (A3).8
Take the strategies dened in the previous section, with a penalty length
T arbitrarily chosen, and fc; cg as the prole to be supported.9 If fc; cg is
a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the proof is trivial, so assume that it
is not (note that this implies that max
s
u1 (s; c)   u1 (c; c) is strictly greater
8Assumptions A1 and A2 are made for simplicity. They are not necessary to derive
the result, and in this note we are going to suggest how the result could be proved if they
dont hold.
Suppose players are in phase 2 for certain history. Under A1, player 1 has no incentives
to deviate because he is playing his static best response. On the other hand, if A1 doesnt
hold, then player 1 could deviate for a short run prot. After this deviation, player 1 will
be punished for T consecutive periods with the prole (p; q). But, the prot is for only
one period, so it is bounded, and the punishment is more intense the larger are  or T .
Hence, for  and T su¢ ciently large the incentive disappears.
Concerning assumption A2, please note that the second part of the assumption is not
restrictive, because q = m2 and hence if q = c then ui (c; c)  v.
Finally, if we need the punishment prole to be such that p = c, it would be di¢ cult
to assess whether fq; cg is a deviation of player 1 or the punishment phase that follows a
deviation of player 2. In the second case, if player 1 deviates and plays c, the strategy in
section 3.1 would identify fc; cg as a cooperation, instead of a deviation of player 1. But
note that q is the static best response to c, so this deviation is not protable.
9The same proof can be replicated for asymmetric games or symmetric games with
c1 6= c2, although with a little bit more notation. Simply we would have two di¤erent ,
one for each player, and it su¢ ces to take the bigger of the two.
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than 0). We need to show three facts. First, the strategies are stationary.
Second, they induce a convergent continuation path, for all histories. And
third, there are no protable deviations. Since the game is symmetric, only
deviations of player 1 will be considered.
The rst and second parts are straightforward, given the denition of the
strategy.
Concerning deviations, the following conditions10 are enough to avoid
them:
u1 (q; p)
 
1 +  +   + t 1+ t
1   u1 (c; c) 
 max
s2S fqg
u1 (s; p) +
T+1
1   u1 (c; c) ; 1  t  T (1)
t
1    u1 (c; c)  maxs2S fpgu1 (s; q) +
T+1  u1 (c; c)
1   ; 1  t  T (2)
u1 (c; c)
1    maxs u1 (s; c) +
T+1
1    u1 (c; c) (3)
Inequalities (1) and (2) rule out deviations in histories following a devi-
ation of player 2 and 1, respectively, with t remaining punishment periods.
Finally, inequality (3) rules out deviations when players are supposed to co-
operate and play c.
It is easy to see that, under our assumptions, condition (1) is always
satised.
Condition (2) is equivalent to
T 
max
s2S fpg
u1 (s; q)
u1 (c; c)
(4)
Note that max
s2S fpg
u1 (s; q)  max
s
u1 (s; q) = v < u1 (c; c). Hence, for a
nite T there exists a 1 2 (0; 1) such that (4) is satised for all  2 [1; 1).
Finally, condition (3) can be expressed as:
u1 (c; c)  T+1  

max
s
u1 (s; c)

 +

max
s
u1 (s; c)  u1 (c; c)

 0 (5)
10We are using the principle that, if the strategies constitute an equilibrium, then it is
enough to check deviations as the following: deviate in one period and then follow again
the strategy. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), section 4.2.
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Note that the left hand side of (5) is a polynomial (in ) of degree
T + 1. Lets call it Y (), so condition (5) is equivalent to Y ()  0. Its
easy to see that Y (0) = max
s
u1 (s; c)   u1 (c; c) > 0, Y (1) = 0, Y 0 () =
((T + 1)  u1 (c; c))  T  

max
s
u1 (s; c)

, and that Y () is (strictly) convex
in (0;1), since u1 (c; c) > 0.
Now, two cases are possible:
Case 1:
max
s
u1(s;c)
u1(c;c)(T+1)  1: In this case the polynomial Y () is (strictly)
decreasing in (0; 1). Since Y (0) = max
s
u1 (s; c)  u1 (c; c) > 0 and Y (1) = 0,
then Y () > 0 for  2 (0; 1). Therefore, there is no equilibrium in this case.
Case 2:
max
s
u1(s;c)
u1(c;c)(T+1) < 1: Here the function Y () is decreasing in

0; ^

,
and increasing in

^; 1

, with ^ =

max
s
u1(s;c)
u1(c;c)(T+1)
 1
T
2 (0; 1). Again, since
Y (0) = max
s
u1 (s; c) u1 (c; c) > 0 and Y (1) = 0, then 92 2 (0; 1) such that
Y ()  0 for all  2 [2; 1).
Note that the value of T determines whether we are in case 1 or 2, and
case 1 can be avoided by taking T >
max
s
u1(s;c)
u1(c;c)
  1.
The proof is complete by considering  = max f1; 2g.
3.3 Bounds for the punishment interval
In this subsection we make a di¤erent type of analysis. Once we have shown
that a stable perfect equilibrium exists for su¢ ciently patient players, we can
ask ourselves the following: for a given (su¢ ciently high) , what values of
T constitute a stable SPE?
We have seen that a necessary condition is
max
s
u1(s;c)
u1(c;c)(T+1) < 1, so the rst
constraint on T is:
T >
max
s
u1 (s; c)
u1 (c; c)
  1 (6)
Other constraints on T are conditions (4) and (5), but now for a xed .
With some algebra we can obtain the following from (4):
T 
log

max
s2S fpg
u1(s;q)
u1(c;c)

log ()
(7)
The numerator and the denominator are negative, and  is big enough
so that the denominator is small enough (in absolute value) to produce a
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sensible bound.
Now, from (5) we get:
T 
log

 maxs u1(s;c)
u1(c;c)
 (1  ) + 1

log 
  1 (8)
Therefore the admissible values for T are the positive integers such that
(6), (7) and (8) are satised. The lower bound is11
max
8>><>>:
log

 maxs u1(s;c)
u1(c;c)
 (1  ) + 1

log 
  1;
max
s
u1 (s; c)
u1 (c; c)
  1; 1
9>>=>>;
and the upper bound is
log

max
s2S fpg
u1(s;q)
u1(c;c)

log ()
Note that the numerator is nite under assumption A1, because max
s2S fpg
u1 (s; q) <
u1 (c; c). The denominator is also nite and di¤erent from 0 for  2 (0; 1).
Therefore, the upper bound is strictly nite, so convergence must be achieved
in a nite number of periods.
The intuition for the upper bound is very simple. Consider the incentives
for a player that is being punished. Clearly, deviation is more protable if
the punishment period is longer. Therefore, the punishment period cannot
be very long, because it would induce deviations.
4 Memory Requirements
In this section we study the memory requirements of the strategies presented
in section 3.1, in an attempt to compare our approach with the theory on
bounded recall. First we will show that our strategies do not work under
bounded recall. This could cast doubt on the complexity of our strategy and
hence on its applicability in the real world, as Aumann (1997) suggests. For
this reason we dene a concept of memory requirements weaker than bounded
11Remember that condition (6) is a strict inequality, and the other two conditions are
weak inequalities.
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recall, and we provide upper bounds for memory requirements under this
weaker denition.
We start by dening absolute memory of a strategy:
Denition 8 A strategy i has absolute memory  (i) =  if  2 N is the
minimum number such that sti(h
t 1) = sti(~h
t 1), for any period t 2 Z, and
for every pair of histories ht 1 2 H and ~ht 1 2 H such that htk = ~htk;8k 2
ft  ; : : : ; t  1g.
We can say that a strategy i satisfy bounded recall if and only if  (i) <
1. Now, it is easy to see that the strategy dened in section 3.1 does not
satisfy bounded recall, as the following proposition shows:
Proposition 9 The strategy dened in 3.1 has innite absolute memory.
Proof. Consider a history ht 1 2 H such that ht 1k = fq; qg ;8k  t   1.
Now, consider another history ~ht 1 2 H such that ~ht 1k = fq; qg ;8k 
t 1; k 6= t , and ~ht 1t  = fc; qg, for some   1. According to the strategy
dened in 3.1, player 1 should play c after history ht 1, whereas he should
play q after history ~ht 1. The proof is complete by taking the limit !1.
The previous proposition shows that our stable strategies cannot be de-
ned under a bounded recall framework. But this does not mean that our
strategies are innitely complicated, because we can provide bounds for their
memory requirements using a denition weaker than absolute memory. We
call this weaker concept conditional memory, and it is dened as follows:
Denition 10 A strategy i has conditional memory  (i; ht 1) =  in
subgame ht 1 if  2 N is the minimum number such that sti(ht 1) = sti(~ht 1),
for every history ~ht 1 2 H such that htk = ~htk;8k 2 ft  ; : : : ; t  1g.
The denition of conditional memory calculates memory requirements,
conditional on being in a particular subgame. On the other hand, absolute
memory is dened without any conditioning, so it can be interpreted as the
maximum conditional memory over all possible histories.
Now, we are in a position to provide bounds for conditional memory
requirements of the stable strategy dened in 3.1:
Theorem 11 Let 1 and 2 be the stable strategies dened in 3.1 for player
1 and 2, respectively. Then,  (i; Pk (ht 1; 1; 2)) = 1 for any t 2 Z; ht 1 2
H; i 2 f1; 2g ; k 2 Z such that k  t+ T .
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Proof. If players play according to the stable strategies dened in 3.1, then
Pk (h
t 1; 1; 2) 2 ffc; cg ; fp; qg ; fq; pgg ;8k  t, depending on the value
of k computed in steps 1 and 2 in the denition of the strategy. More-
over, the proles fp; qg and fq; pg can only last for at most T periods, so
Pk (h
t 1; 1; 2) = fc; cg ;8k  t + T . The proof is complete by noting that
step 1 in the denition of the strategy ignores the part of the history observed
before the most recent fc; cg.
The previous theorem states that, if players play according to the stable
strategies dened in 3.1, then conditional memory requirements eventually
collapse to 1, because eventually both players will be playing c. This means
that conditional memory requirements are nite and small, except from his-
tories that are very far from the equilibrium path implied by our stable
strategies.
5 Concluding Comments
In this paper we have proposed a concept of dynamic stability in repeated
games with discounting for which a modication of the traditional theory
is needed. In particular, we need to introduce a game with no beginning,
i.e. a game with an innite history at all periods. One should keep in mind
issues like reputation or robustness to initial conditions when interpreting
the proposed concept of dynamic stability.
A characterization12 of payo¤s supported as a stable equilibrium is also
presented, with the additional result that convergence to the long-run strat-
egy prole can be achieved in a nite number of periods, for all previous
histories. The proof is constructive, giving the strategies that support the
long run prole. We have also shown that memory requirements of these
strategies are bounded, but under a concept of memory requirements weaker
than bounded recall.
One can look at the contributions of this work in at least three di¤erent
ways. The most direct is the study of games with an innite history, i.e.
with no beginning. A more interesting interpretation is that the theory
developed here provides a formal justication for the folk results often used
in the literature, because all equilibrium paths converge to the cooperative
outcome. In other words, we are checking the robustness of the folk results
to the assumption that strategies begin with certain prole. Finally, the
analysis of the convergence process is interesting by itself. If for whatever
reason players are not cooperating (maybe because someone has deviated in
12This characterization is incomplete in the sense that we have focused on pure strate-
gies, and on games with no uncertainty.
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the past), the strategies presented here provide a way in which players can
build up again their reputations.
The analysis developed here has nevertheless several limitations, and fur-
ther research will be useful. The main limitation is that the theorem requires
a supported outcome in pure strategies. Although the rest of the assump-
tions are innocuous, and are made for simplicity, the requirement of pure
strategies cannot be generalized in a straightforward manner. If we want to
support convex combinations of the pure strategy payo¤s, we cannot apply
the usual argument of a public randomizing device and a correlated distrib-
ution. The reason is that we require the equilibrium path to be convergent,
not to switch at random over a set of outcomes. But one can still have a
notion of dynamic stability in these cases. Perhaps the simplest way is to
substitute condition (b) in the denition of a stable SPE by convergence in
expected payo¤s, not in the prole played. Maybe there are other possibili-
ties, like convergence in distribution over outcomes, even though it may be
di¢ cult to develop stationary strategies with the property that future prob-
ability distribution over outcomes is invariant, irrespective of the realization
of the present (stochastic) outcome.
Second, we have focused on games with no uncertainty, so a concept of
stability for games with some source of uncertainty may be useful. Probably,
the denition will be close to Ely and Välimäki (2002) and Green and Porter
(1984), but the extension is not straightforward. One possibility would be to
make the denition analogous to those used in stochastic processes, assuming
that from now on all stochastic variables take a realization equal to their
mean value (including variables related to imperfect information). Then, the
denition of convergence could be modied accordingly.
Third, it is interesting to note that the folk result presented here is a
limit result. The theorem in section 3.2 states that we can support stable
equilibria for a su¢ ciently high discount factor. It doesnt say anything
about optimal punishment schemes (satisfying stability), in the sense that
there may exist other strategies that require weaker conditions for . This is
obviously another possible extension.
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Abstract
We present an overlapping generations model with human capital and public
R&D that has several interesting features. First, it can generate expectation
cycles of period two in the time that each generation is spending on educa-
tion. Second, a subsidy to education may a¤ect positively growth by making
cheaper the good used in the production of public R&D, human capital.
Third, a subsidy to education plays the role of a nancial system, transfer-
ring resources from old to young people, in the absence of private nancial
markets.
We also develop a calibration exercise for a set of european countries to
obtain the recommendations of the model concerning educational and R&D
policies. We also see if actual policies are close or not to the recommenda-
tions.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, it is almost common knowledge that education is a very important
part of the process of sustained growth. Human capital represents a big frac-
tion of the total accumulated factors in modern economies. Further, human
capital is the main resource employed in the production of new knowledge,
as well as in the adoption of the existing technology.
On the other hand, governments in OECD economies subsidize at least
part of the costs of education. Then, understanding the e¤ects of these
subsidies in the process of growth turns out to be of capital importance.
The main goal of the paper is to study the optimal distribution of sub-
sidies between R&D and education. From a theoretical point of view, R&D
subsidies can be justied by their e¤ects on growth. By contrast, justica-
tions of educational subsidies are more varied. In this paper we are interested
in two of them: First, the role of educational subsidies as a substitute for
the nancial markets faced by young agents. Second, the positive e¤ect of
education on growth through R&D activities. We show that, in theory, both
e¤ects can be present in the economy. This has important implications. For
example, if a nancial market for young people could be constructed, it would
be still optimal to have educational subsidies, due to the second justication.
Or, in other words, policies with the only aim of maximizing growth may
nd optimal to assign some resources to educational subsidies even if growth
is only produced by R&D.
With this motivation in mind, we construct a very simple overlapping
generations model with educational subsidies and public R&D. In this model,
educational subsidies can have three main e¤ects. First, a change in the
subsidy could lead an economy to a situation of multiplicity of equilibria, and
perhaps it can induce cycles in the educational e¤ort of di¤erent generations.
Second, the subsidy encourages human capital accumulation, hence mak-
ing human capital cheaper. If the production of new knowledge is intensive
in human capital, as it is in our model, this e¤ect can raise growth. Note,
however, that a higher growth may not be optimal; it will depend on the
existence of externalities. In our model, human capital has an indirect ex-
ternality that will be discussed below.
Third, educational subsidies can act as a substitute of nancial markets.
Young people are often borrowing constrained, and on the other hand they ex-
pect an increase in their real income through the life cycle. As a consequence,
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young people have incentives to borrow in order to smooth consumption and
to nance their investments in education. Borrowing constraints typically
bind in this situation, and therefore an educational subsidy may increase
welfare, by playing the role of the missing nancial market.
The main features of the model are the following. People live for two
periods. In the rst period, they must allocate their time between human
capital accumulation and the labor market. They also consume in the rst
period. The monetary cost of education is zero, but nevertheless there is an
opportunity cost in the form of foregone earnings. The government subsidizes
a fraction of this opportunity cost. In the second period, agents simply sell
all their raw time and their human capital in the market, and consume the
proceeds. There is no intergenerational altruism. The government levies an
income tax on both young and old people, and uses the proceeds to nance
the subsidy, and to purchase some human capital in the market. It uses this
human capital to provide public R&D.
Now, the indirect externality mentioned above becomes clear. If an agent
studies more time, the relative price of human capital falls. Then, the gov-
ernment can buy more human capital with the same resources, and therefore
it provides more public R&D. The benets of this increase not only are di-
vided among all agents in the economy, but also the rst time they appear
is two generations after. Clearly, the agent does not internalize this e¤ect in
the absence of scal policy.
There are several topics in the literature related to this paper. One is the
endogenous growth literature, both with human capital accumulation and
with R&D as the engines of growth. Another is the literature about optimal
scal policy. Finally, this paper has also implications regarding nancial
markets and borrowing constraints.
There is a wide variety of R&D models with endogenous growth in the
literature. Examples are, among many others, Jones (1995), Howitt (1999),
Segerstrom (2000) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). In many of them there are
rms that produce R&D services, to be used in the same rm or to be sold
in the market in the form of patents. As a consequence, it is often true that
the competitive equilibrium is not optimal in the presence of R&D activities.
This can be due to monopoly power generated by patents, to externalities in
the process of R&D, or to the existence of imitation posibilities.
Our model has, by contrast, public R&D. This allows us to avoid issues
concerning market structure and market power. Furthermore, the main re-
sults of the paper probably would not be a¤ected by the introduction of
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private R&D, and some can be reinforced. Consider for example the second
e¤ect of an education subsidy described above. A lower relative price of hu-
man capital not only induces the government to increase its R&D, but also
it would generate an increase in private R&D if the latter were present in the
model.
Concerning the endogenous growth literature with human capital accu-
mulation as the engine of growth, the most known model is the Lucas (1988)
and Uzawa (1965) model. In this type of economies, long term growth occurs
because the production function for new human capital has constant returns
to scale in some set of reproducible factors, allowing unbounded accumulation
of human capital. The general properties of the model have been analyzed in
a number of works.1 Other papers have studied more specically the problem
of scal policy in this kind of models. King and Rebelo (1990) nd important
growth e¤ects of scal policy, and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993) argue
that this is because they use an endogenous growth model. Focusing on the
educational subsidy, Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) show, among other
results, that the long term optimal subsidy must be zero, and Alonso-Carrera
(2000) analyzes in detail the theoretical e¤ects of the presence of the subsidy.
Our model has at least two important di¤erences with respect to the
Lucas-Uzawa model. First, a model of innitely lived agents appears to
be inappropriate to study the e¤ects of borrowing constraints in education.
Therefore, we have chosen to develop an overlapping generations model. In
this sense, our model is closer to Hendricks (1999, 2001) and de Gregorio
(1996).
Second, in the Lucas-Uzawa model the engine of growth is human capital
accumulation. If this were true, we would expect income level and human
capital to be correlated. There is, however, some evidence suggesting that
income growth is related with human capital.2 If we identify human capital
with concepts like average years of education, one would expect precisely
the second kind of relation, because in a lifetime context, average years of
education (or similar measures) cannot grow without bound. Moreover, with
this latter interpretation, human capital level contributes to the growth of
another variable (knowledge) that indeed can grow without bound. There-
fore, the level of human capital is expected to be related with income growth.
1See, for example, Caballé and Santos (1993), Ortigueira and Santos (1997) and Mul-
ligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993).
2See, for example, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994).
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Our strategy here is to model explicitly the link between human capital and
growth of knowledge, by assuming that R&D services are produced with
human capital services.3
Note, however, that the previous discussion is only about language. We
can interpret human capital in the Lucas-Uzawa model as knowledge. Or
one can have a wider denition of human capital including also the level of
knowledge learned. These issues become important in applied work, where
one needs to identify very clearly which concept one is using.
There is extensive literature covering level and growth e¤ects of tax re-
forms, and optimal taxation.4 Our model is not very appropriate to study
taxation, because in our model the income tax is non-distorting. We focus
on the study of educational subsidies, and the optimal composition of public
expenditure (for a given income tax) between education subsidies and R&D.
This optimal composition is the main lesson in the section of optimal scal
policy. A related work is Rustichini and Schmitz (1991). They analyze a
model in which the government subsidizes both the research activity and the
imitation activity. The composition of public expenditure between these two
concepts is specically studied. They nd that it is optimal to subsidize both
activities.
Also, in our model, there is no waste of public resources. Either they are
spent on education subsidies or on public R&D. By contrast, many models
of optimal taxation assume public expenditure to be non-productive. This
separation between revenues and expenses can be problematic, as discussed
in Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993), particularly in the analysis of optimal
government size. We present in the conclusions an extension that would
make the model appropriate to cover this question.
A close model is the one by Glomm and Ravikumar (2001). They present
an OLG model with two periods in which human capital is produced with the
parental human capital, the resouces spent by the government in education,
3An alternative way of obtaining growth e¤ects from levels of human capital would be to
assume a production function with an ad hoc growth external e¤ect of human capital. But
this would be something di¢ cult to interpret in the traditional terms of imporvements
in productivity when the worker is surrounded by colleagues with high human capital.
Moreover, this formulation would make impossible to analyze the optimal allocation of
public resources between educational and R&D subsidies, which is the main goal of the
paper.
4See, for example, King and Rebelo (1990), Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998), Jones,
Manuelli and Rossi (1993), Chamley (1986), Lucas (1990), Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and
Judd (1985).
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and the time of young people. The model is quite similar to our model.
There are, however, some di¤erences. First, they study the policy choice
problem, assuming that decissions are taken by old people, using majority
voting, whereas we focus on optimal policy. Second, in their model, there is
altruism between generations, and young people cannot work; they choose
between studying or leisure. By contrast, we dont allow for intergenerational
altruism, and young people can work, which means that they must pay the
opportunity cost of studying. With this approach we are able to study issues
concerning borrowing constraints. Third, we model explicitly the relationship
between human capital and R&D (or growth). This allows us to study the
link between subsidies to education and long term growth.
De Gregorio (1996) presents evidence about the importance of borrowing
constraints in the process of development. We agree with his view that
borrowing constraints can reduce growth by reducing the incentives of the
young people to accumulate human capital. As already discussed, we add
to his argument the fact that education subsidies can e¤ectively act as a
substitute of nancial markets in the presence of borrowing constraints.
Finally, Trostel (1993, 1996) shows that, if education has both time and
monetary costs, then the income tax distorts the composition between both
factors because time is actually tax deductible but monetary cost is not.
Then, he shows that a subsidy to monetary costs of education can o¤set
the distortion previously mentioned. He obtains that the optimal subsidy
should be roughly equal to the marginal income tax. Since he focuses on this
particular consequence of subsidies to education, whereas we are focusing on
other e¤ects, his work should be seen as complementary to our study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the description of the model. In section 3, the equilibrium is analyzed. In
sections 4 and 5 the stationary solution and the transitional dynamics of
the model are, respectively, analyzed. Optimal policy is studied in section 6.
Finally, section 7 has some concluding comments and discusses some possible
extensions.
2 The Model
At each period t there are two agents, the young agent and the old agent.
Let cyt and c
o
t be the consumption of the agent that is young in period t,
and old in period t, respectively. There is an instantaneous utility function,
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denoted by u () and a discount factor . Both agents (and in particular the
young agent) are endowed with perfect foresight.
The young agent in period t is endowed with one unit of time, and he has
to decide how much time he devotes to human capital accumulation, which
will be denoted by vt. The remaining time is sold in the market as labor.
The cost of human capital accumulation is foregone earnings.
The old agent in period t + 1 is endowed also with one unit of time,
which he devotes entirely to the labor market, and in addition he has f (vt)
units of human capital, depending on the time he devoted to human capital
accumulation when he was young. The function f satises:
Assumption A1 The function f (vt) is increasing, concave, continuously
di¤erentiable, and satises f (0) = 0, f 0 (1) = 0 and
d

 f 00(vt)f(vt)
(f 0(vt))2

dvt
 0.
The f (vt) units of human capital are sold in the market of human capital,
which is independent from the labor market. When the old agent dies, all
his human capital is lost.
There is a representative rm which produces the consumption good yt
using labor and human capital, with the following production function:
yt = AtH

t L
1 
t (1)
Where Lt and Ht are, respectively, the amount of raw labor and human
capital employed by the rm, and At is a productivity parameter that can
vary over time. The prices of labor and human capital are respectively wlt
and wht .
Finally, there is a government that levies an income tax  . The proceeds
of the tax are used to pay a subsidy to human capital accumulation, which
is a fraction s of the post-tax wage (1  ) wlt per unit of time invested, and
to buy a quantity Rt of human capital in the market that is used to provide
public R&D.
We assume that all the parameters satisfy the following strict inequality:
0 < s;  ; ;  < 1.
The representative young agents problem is to maximize (2)
u (cyt ) +   u
 
cot+1

(2)
Subject to
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cyt = (1  )  wlt  (1  vt) + s  (1  )  wlt  vt (3)
cot+1 = (1  )

wlt+1 + w
h
t+1  f (vt)

(4)
0  vt  1 (5)
Note that, since there is no bequest motive in the model, the solution to
the problem of the old agent is trivial: sell all his time and human capital,
and consume all his income.
Concerning the problem of the rm, prot maximizing conditions are:
wlt = At  (1  ) 

Ht
Lt

(6)
wht = At   

Lt
Ht
1 
(7)
There are three markets in this economy: consumption goods, raw labor,
and human capital. Note that the supply of raw time is one unit from the old
and 1 vt units from the young, and the supply of human capital is simply the
human capital of the old, f (vt 1). Thus, the three market clearing conditions
are, respectively:
cyt + c
o
t = yt = AtH

t L
1 
t (8)
Lt = 2  vt (9)
Ht +Rt = f (vt 1) (10)
Its assumed that the government has a balanced budget at each period
of time. Then, the following equation must be satised:
s  (1  )  wlt  vt + wht Rt = 

wlt  (2  vt) + wht  f (vt 1)

(11)
Now, plug (9) and (10) into (8), (6) and (7) to obtain
cyt + c
o
t = yt = At  [f (vt 1) Rt] [2  vt]1  (12)
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wlt = At  (1  ) 

f (vt 1) Rt
2  vt

(13)
wht = At   

2  vt
f (vt 1) Rt
1 
(14)
Finally, the growth rate of the productivity parameter At is some increas-
ing function A of resources spent on research by the government, Rt:
At+1 = A (Rt)  At (15)
3 Equilibrium
Now we can dene an equilibrium for this economy. In this section, we will
focus on the positive analysis of the economy. Therefore we will dene the
equilibrium taken as exogenously given the two policy parameters s and  .
In section 6 we will make them endogenous by obtaining the optimal policy.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is a sequence of variables

cyt ; c
o
t ; vt; Ht; Lt; Rt; w
l
t; w
h
t
	1
t=1
such that, given a value for v0 and given values for the set of parameters
fs;  ; ; g, the following conditions are satised:
(a) For each t 2 f1; 2; : : :g, the variables cyt ; cot+1, solve the consumers
problem described above, taking as given the variables wlt; w
h
t ; w
l
t+1; w
h
t+1.
(b) The variable co1 satises equation (4).
(c) For each t 2 f1; 2; : : :g, the variables Ht; Lt; wlt; wht satisfy the prot-
maximizing conditions (6) and (7).
(d) The government has a balanced budget each period: (11) is satised
for all t 2 f1; 2; : : :g.
(e) For each t 2 f1; 2; : : :g, the market clearing conditions (8), (9) and
(10) are satised.
Now the rst step is to obtain the solution for the representative agent.
The rst order condition for an interior solution in the consumers problem
is:
u0 (cyt )w
l
t (1  s) =   u0
 
cot+1

wht+1  f 0 (vt) (16)
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Note that u0 (cyt ) is increasing in vt, and u
0  cot+1 and f 0 (vt) are decreasing
in vt. Therefore, if the solution is interior, then it is uniquely determined by
(16).
If the solution is vt = 0, the following must be true:
u0
 
(1  )wlt

wlt (1  s)    u0
 
(1  )wlt+1

wht+1  f 0 (0) (17)
Analogously, if the solution is vt = 1, the following must be true:
u0
 
s (1  )wlt

wlt (1  s)    u0
 
(1  )  wlt+1 + wht+1  f (1)wht+1  f 0 (1)
(18)
The following proposition establishes under which conditions the income
tax  is non-distorting.
Proposition 2 The value of vt that solves the young agent problem does not
depend on  if the function u0 () is homogeneous.
Proof: The factors in (16), (17) and (18) are all independent of  , except
for marginal utilities. Therefore, the optimal vt will depend on  if and only
if the ratio
u0(cyt )
u0(cot+1)
depends on  . Now, if u0 () is homogeneous of degree #,
then:
u0 (cyt )
u0
 
cot+1
 =  cyt
cot+1
#
=
 
(1  )  wlt  (1  vt) + s  (1  )  wlt  vt
(1  ) wlt+1 + wht+1  f (vt)
!#
=
=

wlt  ((1  vt) + s  vt)
wlt+1 + w
h
t+1  f (vt)
#
To nish the proof, note that the last expression is independent of  .
The intuition of the previous proposition is the following. Time can only
be allocated either to work or to study. And, given that the income tax lowers
the return of both activities in the same proportion, the tax is non distorting
when marginal utility is homogeneous. As we mention in the concluding
section, in order to obtain distorting taxes, we should include a non-taxed
alternative to allocate time (v.gr. leisure).
Among the marginal utilities that are homogeneous, we assume for sim-
plicity logarithmic utility, which implies that u0 () is homogeneous of degree
 1. Then (16) becomes
9
1
1
1 s   vt
=
  f 0 (vt)
wlt+1
wht+1
+ f (vt)
(19)
and (17) and (18) become, respectively
(1  s)    f 0 (0) w
h
t+1
wlt+1
(20)
1  s
s
  f
0 (1)
wlt+1
wht+1
+ f (1)
(21)
Note that (no matter the solution is interior or not), (19), (20) and (21)
imply that the optimal solution depends only on the ratio
wlt+1
wht+1
, and the
parameters of the model:
vt

wlt+1
wht+1
; : : :

(22)
Equation (22) gives us the solution of the consumers problem. Once vt
is obtained, we can obtain consumption in both ages using (3) and (4).
Concerning the government, we can rearrange (13), (14) and (11) to ob-
tain:
1  


s  vt
2  vt (1  ) +  
Rt
f (vt 1) Rt

= 1 (23)
Equation (23) denes the value of Rt as a function of vt, vt 1, and the
parameters of the model:
Rt (vt 1; vt; : : :) (24)
Finally, we can calculate the ratio
wlt+1
wht+1
from (13) and (14):
wlt+1
wht+1
=
1  


f (vt) Rt+1
2  vt+1

(25)
Now, if we introduce (25) into (22) we can obtain the solution for vt as a
function of vt+1, Rt+1, and the parameters of the model:
vt (vt+1; Rt+1; : : :) (26)
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Equations (24) and (26) describe the dynamic behavior of the economy.
Note that the optimal solution given by (26) is driven by expectations on
future investments in education and research. It does not depend on current
or past conditions like vt 1 or At. For this reason, the solution of the dynamic
system cannot be characterized by an initial condition, and multiplicity of
equilibria can arise.
In particular, all sequences fvt; Rtg1t=1 satisfying equations (24) and (26)
can be an equilibrium. The initial value v0 has inuence only on the variable
R1. It has no e¤ect on the rest of research e¤orts, and it has no e¤ect on any
educational e¤ort.
As a consequence, if a stationary solution exists, then the stationary
outcome each period is always an equilibrium.5 Of course, there can be other
equilibria too. We need to check if these other equilibria either converge to
the stationary solution or have an explosive (and inconsistent) behavior. If
the latter is true, we can focus on the study of the stationary solution.
The next two sections deal with this issues. In the following one, the
stationary solution is characterized, and in section 5 the dynamics of the
equilibrium are analyzed.
4 Stationary solution
In this section we characterize the stationary solution of the dynamic system
(24) and (26). We denote with an * the stationary values of the variables.
The strategy is to start with the conditions for an interior solution, and
then rule out corner solutions.
Assuming interiority we have the following. From (25) we obtain the
stationary price ratio 
wl
wh

=
1  


f (v) R
2  v

Hence, substituting in the (interior) rst order condition of the consumer
(19) we obtain
5The variable v is equal to its steady state level from period 1 on. The variable R,
however, achieves its stationary value in period 2, with the value of R1 given by (24).
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1
1
1 s   v
=
  f 0 (v)
1 


f(v) R
2 v

+ f (v)
(27)
Now, from the government budget constraint (23) we have
s  v (1  )
2  v +
 R
f (v) R =

1   (28)
Solving for R in (27) we obtain
R = f (v)  
1   (2  v
)

1
1  s   v


  f 0 (v)  f (v)

(29)
Replacing (29) into (28) and simplifying we can obtain
s  v (1  )
2  v +
1  
(2  v)
h 
1
1 s   v
 f 0(v)
f(v)   1
i      
1   = 0 (30)
This equation determines interior stationary solutions. Note that under
assumption A1, the expression
h 
1
1 s   v
 f 0(v)
f(v)   1
i
is decreasing in v,
tends to innity at v = 0 and tends to  1 at v = 1. Therefore, by
continuity, there is one v^ such that
 
1
1 s   v^

f 0(v^)
f(v^)
   1 = 0. We can rule
out solutions of the form v > v^ because
h 
1
1 s   v

f 0(v)
f(v)   1
i
would be
negative, and then we can see from (29) that R > f (v), which is obviously a
contradiction because human capital in the private sector cannot be negative.
Focusing then on the interval [0; v^], note that the left hand side of equation
(30) is increasing in v, tends to
     
1 

< 0 at v = 0, and tends to
innity at v = v^. Hence, by continuity, there is only one interior stationary
value v.
To be sure that the stationary solution is unique we need to rule out
corner solutions. By contradiction, suppose that v = 0. Then, from (20) we
have (1  s)    f 0 (0)

wh
wl

. But this is a contradiction since

wh
wl

tends
to innite as v tends to 0.
Concerning the other corner solution, assume that v = 1. Then (21)
implies that 1 s
s
  f 0(1)
wl
wh

+f(1)
which is a contradiction under A1 since
f 0 (1) = 0, provided that s < 1.
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Note that this argument can be applied to rule out corner solutions also
in equilibria di¤erent from the steady state. The key assumptions here are
the innite marginal productivity of a factor in zero supply and the condition
f 0 (1) = 0.6
In summary, there is only one stationary solution, it is interior, v is given
by (30) and the associated value for R is given by replacing v into (29).
5 Dynamics
To study the dynamics of the model we need to obtain the dynamic equa-
tion that links vt and vt+1. Thus, using (18) and (25) we obtain from the
consumers problem:
1
1
1 s   vt
=
  f 0 (vt)
1 


f(vt) Rt+1
2 vt+1

+ f (vt)
(31)
Now, evaluate (23) in t+ 1 to obtain:
Rt+1 =
f (vt)
1

(1 ) 
svt+1(1 )
(2 vt+1)
+ 1
(32)
Substituting (32) into (31), and after some algebra, we obtain the follow-
ing equation:
  f
0 (vt)
f (vt)

1
1  s   vt

  1 = 1
(2  vt+1)

   svt+1
2 vt+1
 (33)
where  = 
1  +

(1 )(1 ) .
Equation (33) denes a function vt+1 (vt). This function characterizes
the dynamic behavior of the variable v. In particular, it is obvious that
vt+1 (v
) = v. And since vt must belong to [0; v^] for all periods, a divergent
sequence fvtg1t=1 satisfying (33) for all t is not an equilibrium, because it will
eventually violate either condition (d) or (e) in the denition of equlibrium.
6Also note that we can rule out corner solutions with weaker assumptions, namely a
su¢ ciently high marginal productivity of a factor in zero supply and a su¢ ciently low
value for f 0 (1). In order to save functional exibility, this is the approach used in section
6.
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Note, however, that the usual interpretation of absence of equilibrium for
certain initial conditions does not apply in our model, because equation (33)
represents a forward looking condition, not a backward looking one. As a
consequence, the initial condition v0 does not a¤ect future values of v. The
correct interpretation is the following:
Proposition 3 There exists at least one equilibrium. Moreover, in any equi-
librium, v1 must be such that the sequence induced by (33) is non-divergent.
Proof: Once v1 is chosen, the rest of the sequence fvtg1t=2 is uniquely
determined by equation (33). Therefore, the values for v1 that induce a di-
vergent pattern are not equilibria, because eventually equilibrium conditions
(d) or (e) will be violated. Hence the rst young generation will not choose
such values for v1 in equilibrium. The exsitence of at least one equilibrium
is easily shown by noting that vt = v 8t is an equilibrium.
In other words, the rst young generation chooses v1 based on the ex-
pectations fvtg1t=2. And perfect foresight implies that expectations must be
consistent, both internally and with regards to the value v1 chosen. Hence,
the rst young generation neither makes an inconsistent choice of v1 nor bases
his decision on inconsistent expectations.
Using (33) we can easily establish the following property concerning vt+1 (vt):
Proposition 4 The function vt+1 (vt) satises the following: vt > v )
vt+1 (vt) < v
, and vt < v ) vt+1 (vt) > v
Proof: Assume vt > v. Then, f 0(vt)f(vt)
 
1
1 s   vt
 1 < f 0(v)
f(v)
 
1
1 s   v
 
1. Now, (33) implies that (2  vt+1)

   svt+1
2 vt+1

> (2  v)     sv
2 v

,
which implies the result: vt+1 < v. If vt < v the proof is essentially
the same.
The previous proposition establishes that, if the steady state is stable,
then convergence is non-monotone. However, remember from proposition 2
that the dynamics of this model are generated by forward looking behavior,
so unstable equilibria can be ruled out. Therefore, we need to study stability
in order to see if non-monotonicity (and multiplicity of equilibria) is possible.
We can calculate explicitly the function vt+1 (vt) from (33):
vt+1 (vt) =
2
 + s
  1
( + s)

  f 0(vt)
f(vt)
 
1
1 s   vt
  1 (34)
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We can see clearly that it is decreasing in [0; v^]. The intuition behind this
result is the following: Since (34) reects a forward looking condition, then
the fact that the function is decreasing means that a generation wants to
study more if the next generation is expected to study less. But if generation
t believes that generation t + 1 will study less, then generation t will have
more working time to complement with his human capital in t+1. Therefore,
the relative price of human capital will be higher in t + 1, and it is optimal
for generation t to study more.
The slope of the function vt+1 (vt) is what determines stability in our
model. It can be obtained by taking the derivative with respect to vt in
expression (34):
dvt+1 (vt)
dvt
=  

1
 + s
 f 0(vt)
f(vt)
    1
1 s   vt
 
f 00(vt)
f(vt)
 

f 0(vt)
f(vt)
2

h
f 0(vt)
f(vt)
 
1
1 s   vt
  1

i2 (35)
We see that dvt+1(vt)
dvt
< 0 for vt 2 (0; v^). Therefore, if the steady state is
locally stable, then there can be equilibria with a non-monotone convergence
across all the transition. Other properties of the function are presented in
the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The function vt+1 (vt) satises the following:
(a) lim
vt!0
vt+1 (vt) =
2
+s
(b) lim
vt!v^
vt+1 (vt) = lim
vt!v^
dvt+1(vt)
dvt
=  1
(c) lim
vt!0
dvt+1(vt)
dvt
=   1 s
(+s)
(d) d
2vt+1(vt)
(dvt)
2 < 0 for vt 2 (0; v^)
Proof: Parts (a), (b) and (c) are just a matter of taking the corresponding
limit in the appropriate function, (34) or (35). To prove part (d), note that
(35) can be expressed as
dvt+1 (vt)
dvt
=
  1
 ( + s)
 1
f 0(vt)
f(vt)
( 11 s vt)
+ 1 +

 f 00(vt)f(vt)
(f 0(vt))2


1  1

f 0(vt)
f(vt)
( 11 s vt)
2  
1
1 s   vt
 (36)
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The result is obtained by noting that under assumption A1 the numer-
ator of the second fraction is increasing in vt whereas the denominator is
decreasing in vt.
The properties concerning dvt+1(vt)
dvt
(and in particular property (b) in
proposition 4) ensure that there is no global stability, in the sense that there
are sequences fvtg1t=1 satisfying (34) and starting into the interval (0; v^) that
are not credible, because eventually the values of the sequence will lie outside
the interval (0; v^) if v1 is near enough 0 or v^.
Thus, we need to study if the steady state is locally stable, in which
case there is a continuum of equilibria starting in a neighborhood of v and
converging non-monotonically to the steady state. Note that local stability
is characterized by the condition
dvt+1(v)dvt  < 1. In addition, there can be
pairs f~v; vg with ~v < v < v such that vt+1 (~v) = v and vt+1 (v) = ~v, so that
the non-convergent sequence f~v; v; ~v; v; ~v; v; : : :g is also an equilibrium.
If we have neither local stability nor persistent oscillations of period 2,
then perfect foresight implies that the sequence fv; v; v; : : :g is the unique
equilibrium.
The next task is to obtain necessary and su¢ cient conditions for both
local stability and persistent oscillations of period two. Now, it is worth
noting that the policy parameters cannot be chosen freely in the open square
(0; 1)2. As an example, note that taking s ! 1 and  ! 0 is not feasible,
because if  > 0, then  ! 0 implies  ! 0, and the subsidy needs to be
nanced by some taxes. In general, there is a function ^ (s) that gives us the
minimum feasible tax rate for a given subsidy.7 Thus, the constraint that
the two policy parameters belong to the set fs;  :   ^ (s)g is implicitly
assumed in this paper.
A necessary condition for both local stability and persistent oscillations
of period two is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Under assumption (A1) the following is true:
(a) Local stability implies 1 s
(+s)
< 1
(b) The existence of persistent cycles with period 2 implies 1 s
(+s)
< 1
Proof: First recall from proposition 4 that lim
vt!0
dvt+1(vt)
dvt
=   1 s
(+s)
and
d2vt+1(vt)
(dvt)
2 < 0 for vt 2 (0; v^). Local stability is equivalent to
dvt+1(v)dvt  < 1.
7Recall that tax is non-distorting, so government revenues are always increasing in
taxes.
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Now, part (a) is straightforward because dvt+1(vt)
dvt
is decreasing and hence
1 >
dvt+1(v)dvt  > dvt+1(0)dvt  = 1 s(+s) . To prove part (b) note that the existence
of persistent oscillations of period 2 implies that there exist two points f~v; vg
and fv; ~vg di¤erent from the steady state that belongs both to the func-
tion vt+1 (vt) and to its inverse v 1t+1 (vt). The point fv; vg belongs to both
functions. Now, by contradiction, suppose that 1 s
(+s)
 1. By the strict con-
cavity of vt+1 (vt) the absolute value of the slope of this function is increasing
and therefore
dvt+1(v)dvt  > 1 and dv 1t+1(v)dvt  < 1. Now, since dvt+1(vt)dvt  > 1 for
vt 2 (0; v^), then
dv 1t+1(vt)dvt  < 1 for vt 2 (0; v^). But this contradicts persis-
tent oscillations because to the right of v the slopes of both functions are
respectively greater that 1 and smaller that 1 in absolute value, so the two
functions cannot cross themselves in a point di¤erent than fv; vg.
Su¢ cient conditions are more di¢ cult to obtain. In simulations per-
formed by the author, the steady state is locally stable only under very rare
parameter combinations, and typically the assumptions in A1 that ensure
an interior solution do not hold. In any case, all the calibration exercises
in section 6 yield parameter values that clearly imply local unstability and
hence uniqueness.
It is interesting to study the role that the subsidy s can have on the
existence of multiple equilibria. It can be seen that a small s may rule out
both local stability and persistent oscillations. In particular, assume that
 < 1. Then, note that the condition s  1 
1+
implies uniqueness, by
proposition 4, so one can conclude that a small enough subsidy may rule out
multiplicity.
Up to this point we have studied the positive features of the model. In
the next section we will deal with the normative analysis.
6 Optimal policy
Having characterized the competitive equilibrium for a given policy fs; g,8
the next task is to nd policies such that the associated equilibrium satis-
es certain properties. Our focus will be on optimal outcomes. There are,
8In fact, the variable Rt should be part of the policy. Therefore when we speak about
the policy fs; g, what we mean is the policy composed by fs; g, and the associated
equilibrium values for Rt.
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however, several issues to be discussed here.
First, remember that the model can exhibit multiplicity of equilibria. As
a consequence, a number of problems arise. If, for example, for a certain
pair of policies the model has multiplicity, we cannot directly compare them,
because we would need to know the specic equilibrium that is going to
be realized. We would need some equilibrium selection mechanism in order
to make policies comparable. We will deal with this problem by selecting
the stationary equilibrium for each policy with multiplicity. This makes all
policies comparable, because the stationary equilibrium always exists. In
addition, we will see later that in our simulations there is uniqueness, both
in the initial and in the optimal policy, so the stationary assumption is not
restrictive.
Second, since we are using an overlapping generations model, we cannot
maximize the utility of the representative agent because, at best, we have
a representative agent each period. As a consequence, optimality requires
the existence of a planner who maximizes some social welfare function, in-
volving utilities from all generations in the economy. Clearly, the optimal
outcome will be di¤erent for di¤erent weights in the social welfare function.
For example, if the planner puts all the weight in the current old generation,
the optimal policy would probably be s =  = Rt = 0, since both educa-
tion subsidies and public R&D yield only future benets, and the unique
current e¤ect is that a bigger subsidy reduces current labor supply, causing
current returns to human capital to decrease. Our strategy here will be to
assume that the planner maximizes a weighted average of the utilities of all
generations, with weights decreasing at the rate .9
Third, as already discussed, the initial condition (i.e. v0) has no e¤ects
on the equilibrium values of vt, but the rst value for public R&D, R1, is
indeed a¤ected by v0. We will not deal with this problem. Instead, we will
focus on long term optimality, i.e., taking v0 = v.10 In addition, we will
9It should also be mentioned that the result that maximum steady state growth implies
e¢ ciency, present in some OLG models, does not hold in our model. This is because in
our model the maximum growth rate is attained by taking the limit  ! 1 and s ! 1.
But, as long as  ! 1, consumption is tending to 0 for all periods and generations, which
shows that the result does not hold. This is the reason why we are using a social welfare
function.
On the other hand, we will discuss later that the model is not best suited to deal with
the optimal size of the government, so we will x  and maximize only over s. In this case,
maximum growth is a su¢ cient, albeit not necessary, condition for Pareto e¢ ciency.
10Note that in the model, the relative e¤ects of initial conditions nish with the gener-
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normalize A1 = 1.
Fourth, we are avoiding a very serious problem, which is time inconsis-
tency. We will assume that the planner selects a policy at the beginning
and then it is committed to follow this policy forever.11 The fact that we do
not take as given initial conditions (remember from the previous paragraph
that we are taking v0 = v) mitigates in part the problem. We will later try
to measure the size of this problem by introducing the initial condition and
comparing the resulting equilibrium with the one obtained with v0 = v.
Now we are able to describe the planners problem. The planner real-
izes that individuals will react to its policy according to the competitive
equilibrium. Therefore, we include the competitive equilibrium equations as
constraints in the planners problem. As already discussed, we take as initial
conditions v0 = v and A1 = 1.12 Thus, the planners problem is to choose
 , s, and R to maximize
log (co1) +
1X
t=1
t 1

log (cyt ) +  log
 
cot+1

(37)
subject to
cy1 = (1  ) (1  )

f (v) R
2  v

(1  v + s  v) (38)
co1 = (1  ) 
"
(1  )

f (v) R
2  v

+ 

2  v
f (v) R
1 
f (v)
#
(39)
cyt = c
y
1  (A (R))t 1 ; t 2 f2; 3; : : :g (40)
cot = c
o
1  (A (R))t 1 ; t 2 f2; 3; : : :g (41)
ation born at t = 2, with the e¤ect that R1 has on A2. However, this should not be seen
as a very fast transition, since people in the model live for two periods, so one period is
about 20-25 years. Also, the scale of consumption of all future generations is a¤ected by
A2.
11Several studies deal with this problem. See, for example, Phelan and Stacchetti (2001),
Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) or Chari and Kehoe (1990).
12Note that v0 = v implies that initial conditions are varying with the policy choice.
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0  R  f (v) (42)
and the previous equations (28) and (30).
The rst two constraints are simply the constraints in the consumers
problem, but with the equilibrium prices substituted. Notice that the vari-
ables v and R are given by equations (28) and (30).
Constraints (40) and (41) take into account the growth rate of the econ-
omy, which is A (R). Finally, the rst part of constraint (42) is to avoid
the choice of non-a¤ordable education subsidies,13 and the second part is, as
already discussed, to avoid v > v^.
We have calibrated the model for a set of european countries (Belgium,
Spain, France, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovak Republic). The two policy parameters are included
in the calibration process. Also, we have solved the previous problem for
each calibration. Since the tax in the model is non distortionary, and public
expenses are only educational subsidies and R&D (which together represent
a small fraction of total public spending), we have solved the maximization
problem only over s, i.e. keeping the calibrated  xed. In other words, we
are answering the question of how to allocate a given amount of resources
between subsidies and R&D. But there is also another interesting question,
which is: How much resources we should devote to both uses? The model
(as it is now) is not able to answer it; an extension, commented in the con-
clusions, is required. Once the solution for s is obtained, we compare it with
the previously calibrated parameter, in order to assess if actual policies are
close to the optimal ones for each country.
The calibration process is described in the following lines.
The human capital production function that is going to be used is
f (v) = B
 
1  e nv ;B; n > 0 (43)
Note that this function do not satisfy the condition f 0 (1) = 0 in assump-
tion A1. Nevertheless, for large values of n, f 0 (1) is very near to zero, and we
indeed obtain in our calibrations large values of n, so that the solution is in-
terior for all calibrations. Its easy to verify that the remaining requirements
of assumption A1 are satised.
13Or, in our terminology, to ensure that   ^ (s)
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Taking into account that a period should be interpreted as 20-25 years,
we have composed 25 times the average real interest rate between 1991 and
200314 to calibrate .
Concerning the policy parameters, the tax  is chosen directly as the
sum of public expenditures in tertiary education15 and R&D, as a fraction
of GDP. The subsidy is calibrated by dividing public spending in tertiary
education over the total cost of studying. We assume that the opportunity
cost of studying that comes from foregone earnings is given by the o¢ cial
minimum wage in the country. To estimate properly the cost of education
we need to include also the monetary cost of education, which is absent in
the model. We assume that the monetary cost of education is given by total
expenditures in tertiary education.
The parameters  and n are calibrated in the following way. First, we
take two times16 the number of students in tertiary education divided by the
number of workers as the empirical counterpart of v. Second, we obtain data
on the ratio between average wage and minimum wage by dividing GDP per
worker in 2000 over the o¢ cial minimum wage. Note that in the model this
ratio can be expressed as
1 +

1   
1
1  R
f(v)
(44)
Given these two sources of information, we plug the observed value for
v in the equations of the model, and then we choose  and n to satisfy
equations (28) and (30), and to match expression (44) with the observed
ratio of average wage over minimum wage.
Concerning the function A (R), we have chosen a concave function to
reect decreasing returns within a period in the production of knowledge:
A (R) = 1 +   (R) ;  0; 0 <  < 1 (45)
14The period is shorter for Czech Republic (2000-2002), Hungary (1999-2003) and Slovak
Republic (2000-2003).
15We use data only on tertiary education because in the model the variable v is the time
spent on education when agents have an alternative use of the time, which is working.
Hence, we dont want to include previous stages of education.
16We multiply by two because v refers only to the time spent by the young generation,
and data on the number of workers include both young and old people.
The data on both students and workers refers to the year 2000
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We take  = 0:1 to ensure that the long run solution is not going to be
very dependant on parameter changes.
Up to this point, the remaining parameters are A0, B and . We nor-
malize A0 = 1 and B = 1, and choose  to replicate the long term growth
rate of the economy, measured as the average real GDP growth rate between
1991 and 2003. The rst normalization needs no justication, because it
deals only with the units in which output is measured. But the second one
deserves more reasoning, because we cannot change the scale of human cap-
ital without changing at the same time the scale of labor. We indeed can
normalize B = 1 because it can be shown that this parameter only a¤ects the
long term growth of the economy, and this variable can be replicated using
the parameter .
A summary of the results of the calibration is presented in table 1. The
last column is the ratio between average wage and minimum wage.
Table 1: Results of the calibration
Country  s   n v W
Wmin
Belgium 0.0134 0.3623 0.3360 0.5697 8.33 0.1601 2.32
Spain 0.0111 0.3336 0.4053 0.7193 6.30 0.2082 3.56
France 0.0140 0.3222 0.3400 0.5643 8.57 0.1533 2.30
Netherlands 0.0163 0.3897 0.4328 0.4621 19.31 0.1133 1.87
Portugal 0.0125 0.3879 0.4788 0.6160 16.11 0.1406 2.61
United Kingdom 0.0100 0.2745 0.3811 0.5756 13.19 0.1294 2.36
Czech Republic 0.0111 0.4493 0.5705 0.6276 35.23 0.0940 2.69
Hungary 0.0125 0.4172 0.8131 0.7269 21.28 0.1485 3.67
Slovak Republic 0.0089 0.4309 0.8490 0.7135 27.70 0.1258 3.49
Having calibrated the model, we are now able to study optimal policy.
As mentioned above, we will maintain xed the parameter  , and maximize
over the parameter s. We have included the boundary case s = 1 in the
maximization, in contrast with the previous sections. The reason is that
when s = 1 the solution to the consumers problem is the corner solution
v = 1, and not in all cases the solution is continuous at s = 1. For example,
it is easy to show that if 2
+1
< 1, then lim
s!1
v (s; : : :) < 1. Nevertheless,
enforcing v = 1 is always a possibility for the planner, and this is the reason
why we need to include the case s = 1 in the maximization.
We have done two exercises. First, we have maximized (37) over s for each
country using as initial condition v0 = v (case A). Second, we have tried to
measure the importance of the time consistency problem (or the size of the
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incentives to deviate from a committed policy) by using as initial condition
the calibrated value of v, which can be interpreted as the initial condition
when the policy is changing to the optimal one (case B).
Table 2 presents the change in policy for all the countries considered,
both under case A and case B. Note that once  is xed, policy is fully
characterized by s. We present also the change in average annual growth
rates.17
Table 2: Change to the optimal policy
Obs. policy Optimal policy
Country Case A Case B
s Gr(%) s Gr(%) s Gr(%)
Belgium 0.3623 1.55 0.299 2.11 0.226 2.22
Spain 0.3336 2.25 0.268 2.62 0.197 2.73
France 0.3222 1.28 0.332 1.26 0.279 1.35
Netherlands 0.3897 1.65 0.316 1.72 0.218 1.77
Portugal 0.3879 1.84 0.242 2.07 0.143 2.12
United Kingdom 0.2745 2.03 0.220 2.13 0.119 2.22
Czech Republic 0.4493 0.92 0.290 0.98 0.221 0.99
Hungary 0.4172 1.75 0.000 1.93 0.000 1.93
Slovak Republic 0.4309 1.11 0.000 1.38 0.000 1.38
We see that for all countries except France, the optimal subsidy is lower
than the observed one. Clearly, when we switch to case B, the optimal
subsidy is further reduced, because the rst old agent does not benet from
any increases in s (he cannot study more), whereas in case A the rst old
agent starts with more human capital under a higher subsidy. Concerning
growth under optimal policy, it is higher for a lower subsidy.18 This is not
a general result. For higher values of  , it may be the case that growth
is increasing in the subsidy, because a higher subsidy makes human capital
cheaper, allowing the government to provide more public R&D with the same
17The column "observed growth" corresponds to the growth rate used in the calibration
process, i.e. average real GDP growth rate between 1991 and 2003. The two growth
columns under the label "optimal policy" refer to the steady state annual growth rate of
the model under case A and case B, respectively.
18It should be noted that the extrapolation of growth rates depends crucially on the
assumption about the parameter . As a consequence, we should interpret results in
a qualitative way, rather than cuantitative, until we have a more precise calibration or
estimation of the parameter . We nevertheless consider that our value (0.1) is quite con-
servative, and therefore is not responsible of the low optimal education subsidies obtained.
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budgetary resources. If this e¤ect is greater than the reduction in R&D
expenses, the real quantity of human capital purchased by the government
can be increased. But given that we have calibrated very small values for  ,
the second e¤ect dominates and we obtain a negative relationship between
subsidies and growth.
Our optimality criterion is the maximization of a social welfare function
involving utilities from all generations. Therefore, it is interesting to see if
the change to the optimal policy is also a Pareto improvement, compared
to the observed situation. If the answer is not, then we want to know what
generations are worse-o¤ under the new policy. This is done in table 3. The
numbers refer to the period in which the generation is young, and the rst
old generation is represented by 0.
Table 3: Generations worse-o¤ under the new policy
Country Case A Case B
Belgium None None
Spain None None
France All 1
Netherlands 1 1
Portugal None None
United Kingdom None None
Czech Republic 1 1
Hungary 1 1
Slovak Republic None None
The welfare e¤ects are di¤erent depending on generations. We have three
main groups. First, note that a reduction in the subsidy always improves
welfare of the rst old generation, and viceversa. This is because the rst
old generation can only be a¤ected by the factor prices, and a reduction
in the subsidy increases government demand for human capital and at the
same time increases the time devoted to work by the young. Both e¤ects
tend to benet the rst old generation. Second, future generations (in our
case starting from the second) are also better-o¤ under a lower subsidy, and
viceversa. The reason is that, under our calibration, a lower subsidy implies
a higher growth. Therefore, a generation will be better-o¤ if it is su¢ ciently
far in the future. For our calibration, this starts at generation 2. Finally,
the rst young generation is less straightforward to analyze, because there
are two opposite e¤ects. On one hand, a higher subsidy transfers resources
from old to young people, when the marginal utility of consumption is much
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higher due to the missing nancial market. The subsidy plays here the role
of a substitute of the nancial market. But on the other hand (under our low
calibration of ), a higher subsidy means a lower growth, and consumption
of generation 1 when old is indeed a¤ected once by the growth rate. This
reduces further consumption when old, in addition to the pure intertemporal
redistribution.
With these considerations in mind, we can classify countries in three
main groups. First, there are countries (Belgium, Spain, Portugal, United
Kingdom and Slovak Republic) in which the change to the optimal policy is
a Pareto improvement both under case A and case B. This is because the
change is towards a lower subsidy, and the mentioned growth e¤ect domi-
nates for generation 1. The second group (Netherlands, Czech Republic and
Hungary) are countries in which the growth e¤ect is dominated both under
case A and case B. As a consequence, the change to the optimal policy is not
a Pareto improvement, because generation 1 is worse-o¤. Finally, there is a
country (France) in which the change in policy is towards a higher subsidy
under case A. This case is particularly interesting because it appears to be a
mistake: under the new optimal policy, all generations are worse-o¤. This is
a technical problem related to the fact that under case A the initial human
capital is varying with s. The optimization procedure chooses a high value
of s such that the rst young generation would be better-o¤ if the initial
human capital would be the steady state value under the new subsidy. But
once we take into account that the initial human capital is lower, we obtain
that all generations are worse-o¤. In other words, optimization under case
A does not take into account transitional costs to a higher subsidy.
In summary, our model recommends educational subsidies between 0.220
and 0.332 (with the exceptions of Hungary and Slovak Republic, for which the
model recommends no subsidies at all).19 In almost all cases, this implies a
reduction in subsidies to education and an increase in R&D expenses. Also,
the model warns about the incentives to reduce subsidies further if initial
conditions are taken into account. Concerning generational analysis, the
model suggests that the unique generation that may be willing to have high
subsidies is the rst young generation, because the subsidy makes possible to
transfer resources to the age in which the marginal utility of consumption is
higher. On the other hand, future generations prefer higher growth20 (more
19Given that, for our calibrated parameters, the subsidy has no growth e¤ects, the whole
recommended subsidy can be interpreted as a substitute of the missing nancial market.
20Remember that the negative relation between subsidies and growth is not true in
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R&D), and the rst old generation prefers high demand of human capital
(more R&D), and high supply of labor (less time devoted to study). This
suggests a possible explanation for the high subsidies observed. If we had
positive population growth, then the median voter would always be young.
Of course, another explanation is that our calibration procedure overstates
actual subsidies. This would be the case if, for example, the minimum wage
used in the calibration is lower than the wage of a worker with no human
capital.
7 Conclusions
We have developed an overlapping generations model as a framework to
understand some e¤ects of educational subsidies. We have shown that a
change in the subsidy may lead the economy toward a situation of multiplicity
of equilibria, and may generate cycles of period 2. We have also shown that
these cycles can be persistent or non-persistent in the long run.
We have analyzed two e¤ects that could explain a positive optimal sub-
sidy. First, a higher subsidy encourages investments in human capital, mak-
ing the future price of public R&D cheaper. As a consequence, it may be
useful to transfer resources from public R&D to education subsidies in order
to rise real quantity of R&D services. This is true if human capital under the
current subsidy is low, and the tax is high. The second e¤ect is due to the
fact that in our model the young agent is borrowing constrained. He expects
a high increment in his income along the life cycle, but he needs to pay the
opportunity cost of education now, so he would want to borrow if possible.
The absence of nancial markets makes this impossible, and the government
can enforce here a transfer of resources from old to young people using the
subsidy to education, which is an imperfect subsitute of the missing nancial
market.
A calibration exercise for several european countries suggest that the opti-
mal composition of expenses involve a reallocation of funds from educational
subsidies to R&D expenses. The current state of our model, however, cannot
say anythig about the optimal size of total expenses in both concepts.
There are some possible extensions of this work. First, as mentioned
in the previous section, our calibration procedure is designed to study the
general. Under higher values of  it is possible that a higher subsidy indeed increases long
term growth, through a cheaper human capital.
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optimal distribution of resources between educational subsidies and public
R&D, but it does not allow us to analize if total amount of resources devoted
to these two concepts should be increased. This is because the government
in our model has only these two kinds of expenses and, as a consequence,
if we would maximize over the tax, we would obtain unrealistic high values.
Then, an interesting extension would be to include in the model pure public
consumption, which would be an exogenous parameter to be calibrated, so
that we can also maximize over the tax. Also, it would be positive to include
leisure in the utility function, to ensure that the tax is distortionary. These
two modications would allow us to study the interesting problem of the
optimal size of the government.21
Another important extension is to include a third period in agentslives.22
This would allow the existence of a nancial market in which middle aged
people save and young people borrow. By comparing the optimal subsidy
with and without nancial markets we would be able to isolate the two e¤ects
mentioned above, because in the economy with nancial markets the e¤ect
related with borrowing constraints disappears.
Finally, the extension of the model to cover demographic issues may al-
low us to develop a political analysis of the actual policy. Remember that
interests of di¤erent generations at a xed moment in time are in general dif-
ferent so one would not expect the political equilibrium to satisfy any kind
of optimality. As already mentioned, this may explain why actual subsidies
are di¤erent from the optimal ones in democratic economies.
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Ination E¤ects of a Monetary Union
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Abstract
We present a very simple model useful to clarify the relation be-
tween the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect and the existence of a monetary
union. More precisely, we obtain the usual result that countries with
more productivity growth in the traded goods sector will have a bigger
ination rate. However, we nd this e¤ect only for countries belonging
to a monetary union. As a consequence, a central bank of a mone-
tary union can only target average ination because ination di¤eren-
tials are an inevitable consequence of productivity growth di¤erentials
across member countries.
We also explore the implications of the model concerning an en-
largement of a monetary union. The result is that the direct e¤ect of
the accesion of high growth countries is a reduction in the average in-
ation of the monetary union. We also obtain the following additional
e¤ect for the candidate countries: if a candidate is growing faster than
the monetary union average, then it will su¤er an increase in its in-
ation rate when entering into the monetary union, in addition to the
possible change in the monetary policy.
1 Introduction
We present a very simple model useful to clarify the relation between the
Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect and the existence of a monetary union. More pre-
This work is part of the Ph. D. dissertation of the author, supervised by Manuel
Santos, and developed at Universidad Carlos III.
yBanco de España, Alcalá 48, 28014 Madrid, Spain. Tel: +34 91 3385705. E-mail: ser-
gio.puente@bde.es. The author acknowledges nancial support from the spanish MCYT.
zThis paper has beneted from comments by Manuel Santos, Juanjo Dolado, Berthold
Herrendorf and other seminar participants at Universidad Carlos III and Banco de España.
I wish to thank Miguel Pérez for his research assistance. The views expressed here do not
necessarily reect those of the Banco de España.
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cisely, we obtain the usual result that countries with more productivity
growth in the traded goods sector will have a higher ination rate. How-
ever, we argue that this e¤ect will only be present in countries that belong
to a monetary union, whereas the partial e¤ect of productivity growth for
independent countries will be the opposite. As a consequence, a central bank
of a monetary union can only target average ination because ination dif-
ferentials are an inevitable consequence of productivity growth di¤erentials
across member countries.
Concerning the enlargement of a monetary union, one extended argu-
ment is that the accession of countries with high productivity growth will
increase the average ination rate of the monetary union due to the Balassa-
Samuelson e¤ect. Our claim here is that this argument is actually composed
of two. First, the accession of rapid-growth countries will decrease average
ination. Second, the central bank could relax monetary policy as a response
in such a way that the net e¤ect on average ination would be possitive. The
fact that new (fast growing) countries will have more ination than the av-
erage is compatible with a reduction in the average ination rate because, if
monetary policy does not change, the enlargement tends to reduce the ina-
tion rates of all old members of the monetary union. And now we can see
why the central bank could relax monetary policy: the reduction in ination
of old members can put ination rates of slow growth countries very low, or
even negative. In an independent paper, Sinn and Reutter (2001), using a
similar argument, obtain empirically a minimum ination rate for Europe.
The model also identies two e¤ects on the ination rate for the acced-
ing countries. The rst one is the possible change in monetary policy. The
second one is an increase(decrease) in the ination rate for countries growing
faster(slower) than the monetary union average. This latter e¤ect is inde-
pendent of the monetary policy e¤ect, so the total variation in the ination
rate is the combination of both e¤ects. The intuition for this result is the
following. Monetary policy in the monetary union must be dened in terms
of aggregate money supply, i.e. total money supply for the whole union.
However, the way in which this money supply is distributed accross mem-
bers is not homogeneus. In particular, the model predicts that a fast growing
country will attract money from the slow growing countries.
Using data on money supply, ination and growth, we assess the e¤ect
that becoming a member of EMUwill have on the ination rate of an acceding
country. We also decompose this e¤ect into the two components exposed in
the previous paragraph.
In the light of the model, our interpretation of the existing ination dif-
ferentials in the European Monetary Union (EMU) is the existence of pro-
ductivity growth di¤erentials, translated into ination through the Balassa-
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Samuelson e¤ect, whereas in other countries di¤erences are mainly deter-
mined by di¤erent monetary policies. The Balassa-Samuelson argument for
a monetary union works as follows. The prices of tradeable goods cannot dif-
fer between countries due to arbitrage. Therefore, ination di¤erentials must
come from the prices of non-tradeable goods or services. In addition, it ap-
pears that the productivity in the sector of tradeable goods grows faster than
in the services sector. Now, a country with a higher productivity growth in
the tradeable goods sector will have a higher growth in wages, which implies
a higher di¤erence between both sectorial ination rates. Finally, since prices
of tradeable goods are the same across countries, a faster-growing country
will have a higher ination in the services sector and hence a higher aggregate
ination.
There are, however, other explanations for ination di¤erentials that we
want to mention. One possible explanation is that prices are simply adjusting
because the xed exchange rates between local currencies were (more or
less) wrongly xed when the common currency was launched. In the EMU,
the adjustment cannot come from a movement of the exchange rates, and
therefore if a currency was priced at a depreciated value, the price level of
this country will tend to raise until a new equilibrium is reached. However,
this can hardly be the reason behind the ination di¤erentials in the EMU:
This adjustment process would be very fast, due to arbitrage opportunities,
and on the other hand ination di¤erentials remain today, several years after
the x in exchange rates.
Another possible reason is that the countries with a high ination have
structural problems, like lack of competitive markets or high labor costs. If
this is true, economic institutions in these countries must work towards a
solution to these problems. But in this case, one should only expect level
e¤ects in prices.1 It is di¢ cult to argue that these structural problems can
inuence ination rates in a persistent way.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
present the model. In sections 3 and 4 we analyze the equilibrium for coun-
tries with independent monetary policy and countries inside a monetary
union, respectively. In section 5 we study the ination e¤ects of a monetary
union for a candidate country. In section 6 we present the macroeconomic
data of the EMU, and we see if the predictions of the model are in the data.
Also we make a simulation exercise to see the possible e¤ects of the enlarge-
ment of the EMU. Finally, we present in section 7 nal conclussions, and
1If there are ination di¤erentials, either between countries or between sectors, not
supported by di¤erent developments in real costs or productivities, then some relative
price is tending to innity, which is clearly not sustainable in the long run.
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some thoughts about european policies.
2 The Model
In this section we present a very simple model that helps to explain ination
di¤erentials between countries of a monetary union as a function of produc-
tivity growth di¤erentials. The model is a reduced form of a cash-in-advance
model. The link between the two models is presented in appendix 1.
Assume that there is a set of countries, which is denoted by I, and i 2 I
represents a generic country.
The population of each country has an endowment of one unit of time at
each period. There is no leisure, so the consumers will sell all their labor en-
dowment in the market. We will suppose that migration costs are prohibitive,
so that we will not have migration at equilibrium. Alternatively, we could
suppose that productivity di¤erentials are embodied in people, for example
in the form of human capital, and therefore the incentives for migration are
small and could hardly compensate migration costs.
There are two sectors in each country. Both sectors use only one input,
labor, to produce the output.
The rst one is the services sector, with a per capita output denoted by
Sit . The productivity in this sector is equal to the constant s, which is the
same for all countries and periods. The output of this sector is not tradeable
between countries.
The other sector, the goods sector, produces a per capita quantity of
Git. All countries enjoy exogenous technological progress. This productivity
growth is not common to all countries, so two di¤erent countries will have in
general di¤erent productivity growth rates. The productivity of the goods
sector in country i at period t will be denoted by Ait, and its growth rate
will be denoted by Ait. In the sequel, we will denote the growth rate of
a variable by the symbol . Finally, the output of this sector is tradeable
between countries.
Suppose that country i devotes to the goods sector a fraction it of its
labor force at period t. Then, the per capita output of both sectors can be
expressed as:
Sit = s
 
1  it

(1)
Git = A
i
t  it (2)
Now, note that the price of goods (in terms of local currency) will be the
same across countries at each period t, because goods are tradeable between
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countries. Specically, let Pgit be the price of goods, in local currency terms,
in country i at period t. Now, let ijt be the price of one monetary unit of
country i in terms of monetary units of country j. Then, the prices Pgit and
Pgjt satisfy the following relation:
Pgjt = Pg
i
t  ijt (3)
Now, if countries belong to a monetary union, the price of goods is the
same across countries: Pgit = Pgt;8i 2 I.
On the other hand, the price of services may be di¤erent across countries
even in a monetary union, because they are not tradeable. Therefore, we will
denote by P it the price of services, in local currency terms, in country i at
period t, no matter if we have a monetary union or not.
Since there is no migration, wages may be di¤erent across countries. As
in the price of services, let W it denote the price of one unit of labor, in local
currency terms, in country i at period t, no matter if we have a monetary
union or not.
Now, prot maximization in both sectors implies the following conditions:
P it =
W it
s
(4)
Pgit =
W it
Ait
(5)
Using (4) and (5) we can obtain the relation between prices in one country:
P it =
Pgit  Ait
s
(6)
To close the model, we assume that there is a representative consumer in
each country, endowed only with one unit of labor each period. The consumer
sells this unit in the labor market. The preferences over goods and services
are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Then, the problem is to
maximize  
Git
i  Sit1 i (7)
subject to
Pgit Git + P it  Sit = W it (8)
The solution to this problem is given by the following demand functions:
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Git = i
W it
Pgit
(9)
Sit = (1  i)
W it
P it
(10)
Since relative prices are determined by non-arbitrage conditions, these
demand functions determine only the fraction of time devoted to each sector.
Consequently, using (4), (5), (9) and (10) we can conclude that
it = i (11)
Note that, due to the fact that there is only one tradeable commodity,
trade between countries will not occur in equilibrium.
3 Countries with IndependentMonetary Poli-
cies
Assume that per capita money supply in each country is given byM it . Then,
the monetary equilibrium2 is given by the following equation
Pgit Git + P it  Sit =M it (12)
assuming that expenditures equate the demand for money. Alternatively,
one can use income as the demand for money. In this case, the monetary
equilibrium is given by
W it =M
i
t (13)
Both expressions are equivalent. As already pointed out, the reader can
nd some microfoundations of equations (12) or (13) in the appendix 1.
Monetary policy is summarized by the parameter it, which is a measure
of money supply growth rate.
Then, using equations (4), (5) and (13), the growth rate of prices in both
sectors is given by
P it = 
i
t (14)
Pgit =
1 + it
1 + Ait
  1 (15)
2Assuming that velocity of money is one.
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Using (3), we can express the exchange rates as a function of monetary
policies:
ijt =
M jt
M it
 A
i
t
Ajt
(16)
Now, dene ination in country i, it, as
1 + it = 
g

1 + Pgit

+ s

1 + P it

(17)
with
g =
Pgit Git
Pgit Git + P it  Sit
= i (18)
s =
P it  Sit
Pgit Git + P it  Sit
= 1  i (19)
Hence, we can express the ination rate as:
1 + it = i
1 + it
1 + Ait
+ (1  i)
 
1 + it

=
 
1 + it
 i
1 + Ait
+ (1  i)
!
(20)
We can see that, in countries with independent monetary policy, the
ination rate depends negatively on the size of the goods sector (i), and its
productivity growth (Ait), and depends positively on the monetary policy
itself (it). Consequently, we need a money growth measure to be able to
compare ination rates across countries. In particular,
@it
@Ait
=   (1 + 
i
t)i
1 + Ait
2
Hence, the negative e¤ect of Ait on 
i
t is more intense the higher is 
i
t.
In summary, the model establishes that a higher ination di¤erential
across sectors caused by the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect implies a lower ina-
tion rate in goods rather than a higher ination rate in services, if monetary
policy does not change.
Another interesting question is how productivity growth di¤erentials could
a¤ect the relative price between two countries, or the real exchange rate.
From (3), it is clear that the real exchange rate computed only with good
prices is always equal to 1. However, if we compute the quotient between
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aggregate price indexes of both countries, this is no longer true. Lets call
this quotient #. Then, from (16) and (20) we get:
1 + # =
1 + it
1 + jt

1 + ijt

=
(1 + it)

i
1+
Ait
+ (1  i)

 
1 + jt
 j
1+
A
j
t
+ (1  j)
  1 + jt

1 + Ait

(1 + it)

1 + Ajt

=
i + (1  i)

1 + Ait

j + (1  j)

1 + Ajt

=
(1  i) Ait
(1  j) Ajt
Hence, movements in the real exchange rate calculated with both goods
and services are determined by relative productivity growth rates and relative
service shares.
4 Countries Inside a Monetary Union
Let j denote the weight of country j in the monetary union.
3 Now, the
money supply is Mt for the whole monetary union. Since the output of the
goods sector is tradeable, the price needs to be the same in all countries
inside the monetary union, say Pgt. As before assume that
Mt = t (21)
Now, the monetary equilibrium is characterized by the equation:X
j2I
j
 
Pgt Gjt + P jt  Sjt

=Mt (22)
Or, in terms of income: X
j2I
j W jt =Mt (23)
3These weights should be proportional to population measures, not to production mea-
sures, because all variables in equations (12) and (13) are in per capita terms.
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Now we can use (5) to substitute for W jt :X
j2I
j  Pgt  Ajt =Mt
Pgt =
MtP
j2I
j  Ajt
(24)
The ination rate of the goods sector depends on the (common) monetary
policy (Mt) as well as on the weighted average productivity of the goods
sectors across the countries inside the monetary union. As before, assume it
is denoted by Pgt. Note that this rate is the same for all countries, and it
depends negatively on the productivity growth rates of all countries.
We can use (6) to obtain the ination rate of the services sector for country
i:
1 + P it =
 
1 + Pgt
 
1 + Ait

(25)
We see that it depends on the common ination in the goods sector, and
on the productivity growth rate of country i.
The last step is to obtain the average ination rate combining the growth
rates of both prices:
1 + it = i
 
1 + Pgt

+ (1  i)

1 + P it

(26)
Now, introducing (25) into (26):
1 + it = 1 + Pgt + (1  i)  Ait 
 
1 + Pgt

(27)
We see that the di¤erences in the ination rate between countries depend
only on the product of the productivity growth in the goods sector of the
country and the share of the services sector in the country, (1  i)  Ait.
More precisely, we can summarize these ndings in the following result:
Theorem 1 Under the above conditions, for each pair of countries i; j we
have:
it  jt () (1  i)  Ait  (1  j)  Ajt
Proof: Immediate from equation (27).
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5 Ination E¤ects of a Monetary Union
Now suppose that a country i with an independent monetary policy is con-
sidering to enter into a monetary union. We can compare the ination rate
under the independent regime with the ination rate under the monetary
union. Clearly, the result of the comparison will depend on the di¤erences
between the independent policy and the policy adopted by the union. If the
country has a more expansive monetary policy than the union, then probably
ination will be reduced when entering into the union.
To isolate other e¤ects from the change in monetary policy, assume that
the monetary growth under the independent regime is equal to the monetary
growth of the union, it = t. Remember that the ination rate under the
independent regime is given by equation (20). Now we need to obtain the
explicit expression of the ination rate under the monetary union. We can
rewrite (27) as
1 + it =
 
1 + Pgt
 
1 + (1  i)  Ait

(28)
Now lets call At =
P
j2I j  Ajt . Then, equation (24) can be expressed
as
Pgt =
Mt
At
(29)
or, alternatively
1 + Pgt =
1 + t
1 +  At
(30)
Now, plug (30) into (28) to obtain the explicit expression of the ination
rate of a country inside the monetary union:4
1 + it =
1 + t
1 +  At


1 + (1  i)  Ait

(31)
At this point we are able to characterize the relative size of both ination
rates:
Theorem 2 Suppose that monetary growth is the same in both regimes, it =
t. Then, the ination rate under the independent regime will be higher or
equal than the corresponding rate inside the monetary union if and only if
 At  Ait.
4Note that At includes Ait.
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Proof: Comparing equations (20) and (31) we can obtain the following
set of inequalities
 
1 + it
 i
1 + Ait
+ (1  i)
!
 1 + t
1 +  At


1 + (1  i)  Ait

i + (1  i)

1 + Ait

 1 + Ait
1 +  At


1 + (1  i)  Ait

1 + (1  i)  Ait 
1 + Ait
1 +  At


1 + (1  i)  Ait

1 +  At  1 + Ait
which proves the result.
The intuition of this result, as stated in the introduction, is that although
aggregate money supply is the same for all countries, the distribution accross
them is not homogeneus. In particular, fast growing countries are attracting
money from slow growing countries. As a consequence, money supply in
fast countries is indeed growing faster than the aggregate money supply and
hence they will have an additional inationary pressure.
6 Macroeconomic Data
The Euro was implemented as the o¢ cial currency by 12 countries of the
European Union at the beginning of year 1999, and hence we will use data
from 1999 up to the present. We portray in tables 1 and 2 the evolution
of ination and GDP growth for several groups of european countries. The
column Av. is the average of the corresponding variable between 1999 and
2003. The rst important feature that we see in the data about ination
and GDP growth is that there is at least some heterogeneity. The highest
ination rate is more than three times bigger than the lowest, and di¤erences
are greater in GDP growth.
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Table 1: Ination and GDP growth in EMU members
Ination GDP growth
Country 99 00 01 02 03 Av. 99 00 01 02 03 Av.
Belgium 1.1 2.7 2.4 1.6 1.5 1.9 3.2 3.8 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.8
Germany 0.6 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.0 1.2 2.0 2.9 0.8 0.2 -0.1 1.2
Greece 2.1 2.9 3.7 3.9 3.4 3.2 3.4 4.4 4.0 3.8 4.7 4.1
Spain 2.2 3.5 2.8 3.6 3.1 3.0 4.2 4.2 2.8 2.0 2.3 3.1
France 0.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.2 1.7 3.2 3.8 2.1 1.2 0.1 2.1
Ireland 2.5 5.3 4.0 4.7 4.0 4.1 11.3 10.1 6.2 6.9 1.6 7.2
Italy 1.7 2.6 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.4 1.7 3.1 1.8 0.4 0.3 1.5
Luxembourg 1.0 3.8 2.4 2.1 2.5 2.4 7.8 9.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 4.1
Netherlands 2.0 2.3 5.1 3.9 2.2 3.1 4.0 3.5 1.2 0.2 -0.9 1.6
Austria 0.5 2.0 2.3 1.7 1.3 1.6 2.7 3.4 0.8 1.4 0.9 1.8
Portugal 2.2 2.8 4.4 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.8 3.4 1.7 0.4 -0.8 1.7
Finland 1.3 3.0 2.7 2.0 1.3 2.1 3.4 5.1 1.1 2.3 1.5 2.7
EURO zone 1.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.8 3.5 1.6 0.9 0.4 1.8
Source: Eurostat
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Table 2: Ination and GDP growth in other european countries
Ination GDP growth
Country 99 00 01 02 03 Av. 99 00 01 02 03 Av.
Bulgaria 2.6 10.3 7.4 5.8 2.3 5.6 2.3 5.4 4.1 4.8 4.5 4.2
Cyprus 1.1 4.9 2.0 2.8 4.0 3.0 4.7 5.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 3.5
Czech Rep. 1.8 3.9 4.5 1.4 -0.1 2.3 0.5 3.3 3.1 2.0 2.2 2.2
Denmark 2.1 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.8 1.6 1.0 0.8 1.8
Estonia 3.1 3.9 5.6 3.6 1.4 3.5 -0.6 7.3 6.5 6.0 4.4 4.7
Hungary 10.0 10.0 9.1 5.2 4.7 7.8 4.2 5.2 3.8 3.5 2.9 3.9
Iceland 2.1 4.4 6.6 5.3 1.4 3.9 5.4 6.5 3.0 -0.6 2.1 3.2
Lithuania 0.7 0.9 1.3 0.4 -1.1 0.4 -1.8 4.0 6.5 6.8 6.6 4.4
Latvia 2.1 2.6 2.5 2.0 2.9 2.4 2.8 6.8 7.9 6.1 6.0 5.9
Norway 2.1 3.0 2.7 0.8 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.8 1.9 1.0 1.0 1.8
Poland 7.2 10.1 5.3 1.9 0.7 5.0 4.1 4.0 1.0 1.4 3.3 2.8
Romania 45.8 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.3 32.2 -1.2 2.1 5.7 4.9 4.6 3.2
Slovenia 6.1 8.9 8.6 7.5 5.7 7.4 5.9 4.1 2.9 2.9 2.1 3.6
Slovak Rep. 10.4 12.2 7.0 3.3 8.8 8.3 1.5 2.0 3.8 4.4 3.8 3.1
Sweden 0.6 1.3 2.7 2.0 2.3 1.8 4.6 4.3 0.9 1.9 1.4 2.6
United Kingdom 1.3 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 2.8 3.8 2.1 1.7 2.0 2.5
Source: Eurostat
We have also di¤erences in the data of european countries outside the
EMU.
As we see in equations (27) and (31), our model predicts that ination
should be positively related with GDP growth inside the EMU. Further, due
to di¤erences in monetary policy, the model also predicts a very weak relation
between both variables for countries outside the EMU, or for Euro countries
before the existence of EMU, unless we introduce money supply as a control
variable. To check these facts, we have run two regressions.5 We have taken
real GDP growth6 as the regressor, and ination as the dependent variable.
The rst regression uses the average data from countries inside the EMU
from 1999 to 2003. The results are as follows (standard errors are shown
below the estimated parameter):
5All variables in this regressions are expressed in percentage points. We have used
average annual growth rates of prices, money supply and GDP. Please note that we are
not using annual data, so there is only one observation per country. As a consequence,
the number of observations is very low and results should be interpreted with caution.
6The results do not change neither qualitatively nor quantitatively if we use real
GDP per capita or real GDP per worker instead. The two equations are, respectively,
HICPgr = 1:6961
(0:3888)
+ 0:3576
(0:1491)
GDPgr and HICPgr = 2:1304
(0:3089)
+ 0:3136
(0:1834)
GDPgr.
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HICPgr = 1:5792
(0:3786)
+ 0:3333
(0:1194)
GDPgr (32)
where HICPgr represents the ination rate calculated using the HICP,
and GDPgr represents the growth rate of real GDP. Clearly, the positive
relationship between ination and GDP growth is signicative. The R2 sta-
tistic is 43.8%. This is exactly what the model predicts.
Now lets focus on countries with independent monetary policies. To
avoid di¤erences in the countries included in the sample, we have repeated
the exercise for the same set of countries, but before the Euro was launched.7
Equation (20) establishes that the marginal e¤ect of productivity growth on
ination is negative. Also, we need to include money supply as a regressor if
we want to isolate this marginal e¤ect of productivity growth. This is studied
in the second regression:
ICPgr = 2:5470
(0:6198)
  1:2277
(0:2354)
GDPgr + 0:5812
(0:0827)
Mgr (33)
Mgr is the growth rate of the money measure M2. The two marginal
e¤ects are clearly signicative, and they have the expected sign. The R2
statistic of this regression is 85.5%. Again, this is what we expect from the
model.
To further explore if this is a feature of countries with independent mon-
etary policies, we have repeated regression (33) using data from european
countries outside the EMU. According to the model, we expect the same
signs in this new regression because we have in both cases countries with in-
dependent monetary policies. The estimated equation conrms these signs:
HICPgr = 5:6723
(2:4838)
  3:2123
(0:6940)
GDPgr + 0:9146
(0:0868)
Mgr (34)
HereMgr is the growth rate of the money measure M2 except for Sweden,
where M3 is used instead. As before, the two marginal e¤ects have the
expected sign and are signicative.8 The R2 statistic of this regression is
89.5%.
7In particular, we have considered annualized growth rates between years 1991 and
1997. The HICPs have been substituted by the national ICPs.
8One striking result is that the coe¢ cient of GDP growth is indeed too negative. One
possible interpretation is that a higher growth gives sustainability to scal policy, and
hence it reduces the expectations of using money to nance scal decits. Probably,
this e¤ect was less important in EMU countries during the 90s due to the reputation
and independence of most of their central banks. Therefore, the ination response to
an increase in GDP growth is greater for the acceding countries. See Sargent (1982) for
details about this interpretation.
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Hence, we can conclude that the di¤erent sign of the coe¢ cient is due to
the di¤erent behavior of ination in countries with di¤erent monetary policy
regimes.
We have repeated the analysis using growth rates of a given year instead
of average growth rates across several years. The sign of all parameters for
all years is the expected, although the larger dispersion of annual data tends
to reduce signicance. We have also tried using GDP deactor instead of
HICP, with very similar results.
Andrés et al. (1996) provide further evidence. They analyze the e¤ects of
ination on growth, using four years averages. Their nding is that the coef-
cient is more negative for countries under a oating exchange rate regime.
The evidence concerning countries under a xed exchange rate regime is less
clear; the coe¢ cient is positive or negative depending on the specication,
but in all cases its magnitude is small. To the extent that a xed exchange
rate regime is a situation close to a monetary union, their evidence supports
our results.
In summary, our model has predictions qualitative close to the data,
particularly in the medium or long run.
Now we can use the model to study the e¤ects of the enlargement of EMU
on the ination rates of previous members and candidate countries, as well
as on the average ination rate of the enlarged Euro zone, assuming that
Euro area monetary policy does not change.9 We will analyze specically
the accession of ten countries;10 other scenarios can be easily analyzed.
The model predicts di¤erent e¤ects for countries previously in the EMU
and candidate countries. Assume that money supply growth in EMU does not
change. Assume also that productivity growth rates for all countries remain
unchanged. If we look at equation (31), we see that the unique e¤ect for a
previous member is the possible variation in  At. We can expect a catching-
up process in the new members, so it is sensible to expect an increase in
 At following the enlargement. Therefore, the prediction of the model for all
previous members is a reduction in their ination rates.
The same reasoning can be applied to the average ination rate of the
EMU. Interpreting the monetary union as an independent country, we can
use equation (20) to make the analysis. The two e¤ects that we can indentify
in the equation are the change in productivity growth and the change in sec-
torial shares. We have argued that we expect an increase in the productivity
growth. Concerning i, the candidate countries have services sectors smaller
9In other words, the e¤ects described below are in addition to a possible change or
reaction in the monetary policy of the Euro area.
10Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slove-
nia, Cyprus and Malta.
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than the EMU average, so the services share will decrease following the en-
largement. Both e¤ects work in the same direction, so the model predicts a
reduction in the average ination rate of the enlarged EMU.
The last step is to study the ination e¤ects for candidate countries. The
model here identies two di¤erent e¤ects. One is the change in the monetary
policy and the other is the money attraction e¤ect described in section 5.
In order to compare both e¤ects and to see which of them dominates, we
have made a simulation exercise, described in Appendix 2. This procedure
estimates the total e¤ect for candidate countries and splits it into the two
mentioned e¤ects, change in monetary policy and money attraction. The
results are presented in the following table.11
Table 3: Ination E¤ects of the Enlargement for Candidate
Countries12
Country Prev.Inf New Inf Total Ef. Mon. Policy Money Attr.
Cyprus 4.66 5.71 1.05 -3.96 5.01
Czech Rep. 2.98 0.57 -2.42 -1.19 -1.23
Estonia 4.64 4.91 0.28 -4.99 5.27
Hungary 8.72 3.48 -5.24 -8.44 3.2
Lithuania -0.10 2.97 3.08 -0.05 3.12
Latvia 3.22 6.45 3.23 -4.58 7.81
Malta 3.26 1.80 -1.47 -1.53 0.06
Poland 4.87 0.67 -4.20 -3.59 -0.61
Slovenia 7.04 1.65 -5.38 -6.50 1.12
Slovak Rep. 5.61 2.19 -3.42 -4.61 1.19
Table 3 should be interpreted in the following way. The column labeled
"Mon. Policy" gives the variation in ination of a country if it implements
the same money growth rate than the Euro area, but without entering into
it. We obtain negative values for all countries, which means that monetary
policy in Euro area is more restrictive than in all the acceding countries.
The last column is the change in the ination rate of a candidate country
that would occur if monetary policy were the same both in EMU and in the
candidate country. The predominance of positive values reects the fact that
almost all acceding countries have real GDP growth rates higher than the
EMU average. Finally, column "Total Ef." is the combination of the two
mentioned e¤ects, i.e. it gives the total variation in ination of a candidate
11We use here GDP deactor as a measure of prices because HICP is not available for
Malta. The results are, nevertheless, very similar using HICP.
12The data are expressed in percentage points.
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country when becoming a member of the EMU, given its current real GDP
and money growth rates. We can see that most countries would experiment a
decrease in their ination rates entering the EMU. And this is despite of the
fact that these countries are growing faster than the EMU. The reason is that
the e¤ect of a change in monetary policy is so important that it dominates
the money attraction e¤ect.
7 Concluding Comments
We have presented a model that claries the relation between the Balassa-
Samuelson e¤ect and the existence of a monetary union. We argue that the
partial e¤ect of productivity growth on ination is positive only for countries
belonging to a monetary union. This partial e¤ect for countries with indepen-
dent monetary policies becomes negative once we take into account money
supply growth. As a consequence, the central bank of a monetary union
can only target average ination rate, whereas ination di¤erentials will be
determined by di¤erences in productivity growth. We have also seen that
this implications are close to the empirical evidence, especially for medium
or long run data.
An additional result of the model is that if a country enters into a mon-
etary union, then its ination rate will rise if the country is growing faster
than the union average, and viceversa. This e¤ect is in addition to the e¤ect
of a change in the monetary policy. The intuition is that the central bank
determines the total money supply, but the distribution of this total amount
is not homogeneous: A fast growing country will attract money from low
growing countries and, as a result, money supply of the former is indeed
growing more than the average. This money attraction e¤ect introduces an
additional inationary pressure for fast growing countries.
We have studied the implications of the model concerning the EMU en-
largement. In particular, we have analyzed the e¤ects of an enlargement when
the acceeding countries grow faster than the EMU average. The model pro-
vides very clear predicitions for the ination rates of previous members: they
will be reduced. The same prediction applies to the EMU average ination
following the enlargement. Concerning candidate countries, the prediction
of the model is not so clear. As already mentioned, the total e¤ect is a com-
bination of a change in monetary policy and a money attraction e¤ect. We
have made a simulation exercise to analyze both e¤ects. The result is that
the monetary policy e¤ect is negative for all countries, which means that the
EMU monetary policy is less expansive than the policies of candidates. On
the other hand, the money attraction e¤ect is positive for eight of the ten
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countries analyzed. The combination of both e¤ects is negative for six of ten
countries, so, in general, candidate countries will have less ination inside
the EMU.
There are several implications of the model that are very important for
the EMU. First, the observed ination di¤erentials are not a short term
phenomenon. They will remain until the countries grow at the same rate.
The empirical evidence shows that the process of convergence in productivity
growth is slow13, so we cannot expect homogeneus ination rates in the short
run. An important implication is that a requirement of homogeneous ination
rates for EMU members is senseless.
There is an assumption in the model that deserves special mention, namely
the absence of migration across countries. We have already mentioned two
possibilities here, prohibitive migration costs or productivity di¤erentials em-
bodied in workers in the form of human capital. The policy implications are
di¤erent. In the second case the governments cannot do anything but fos-
tering real convergence to reduce ination di¤erentials. But in the rst case,
policies aimed to increase labor mobility are appropriate to achieve more ho-
mogeneous ination rates. It is very likely that the european reality is in the
middle of the two possibilities. If this is the case, there is room for economic
policy in the task of reducing ination di¤erentials.
Another important implication is that candidate countries should have in
mind that entering the EMU has a rising e¤ect in ination for fast-growing
countries. We have seen, however, that this e¤ect is dominated in most
countries by a more restrictive monetary policy, so the predicted net e¤ect
is in most cases a decrease in ination. On the other hand, the Euro zone
countries need to take into account the predicted reduction in ination rates.
And if this imply a danger of deation for some countries, all of them (EMU
members and candidates) must realize the posibility of a movement in the
European Central Bank (ECB) towards a more expansive monetary policy.
Concerning the requirement of homogeneus ination rates for candidate
countries before they enter the EMU, we can make the following reasoning.
Monetary policy for candidate countries should be such that the change in
the ination rate is not very drastic at the entering moment. However, this
doesnt imply that ination rates should be very close to the average EMU
ination. It depends on the productivity growth di¤erentials. As a conse-
quence, our proposal is that ination requirements should be designed taking
into account growth di¤erentials, i.e. allowing a fast growing country to have
more ination before entering, because it will still have more ination after
entering.
13See for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)
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One can argue that the small growth of the services sector is due to
measurement problems concerning the quality of these services. If this is
true, the high ination rate of services is reecting an increase in quality. But
as long as european policies are designed as a function of measured ination,
the fact that ination is reecting or not quality growth is not relevant. From
our point of view, it is equivalent to dene ination thresholds as a function
of GDP growth, or to impose a unique threshold, but for ination rates that
take into account quality increases.
Finally, we want to stress that the unique concern of this paper is the
study of ination rates. Of course, monetary unions have other benets (like
reductions in transaction costs) and costs (like di¢ culties to accommodate
asymmetric shocks) that need to be analyzed by implicated governments.
Appendix 1
In this appendix we show that the presented model is a reduced form of
a cash-in-advance constraint model. This would help to interpret equations
(12) and (22).
Suppose that both goods and services need to be paid with money. The
consumer spends her current money holdings and a direct transfer (T it ) from
the government in purchasing goods and services. On the other hand, the
consumer earns a wage, which is used to accumulate money for the next year.
The transfer is nanced by issuing more money, so it needs to satisfy
T it =M
i
t  M it 1 (35)
Now we are in a position to obtain the reduced model. The consumers
problem is to maximize
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 
Git
i  Sit1 i
subject to
Pgit Git + P it  Sit =M it 1 + T it (36)
M it 1 = W
i
t 1 (37)
Combining equations (36) and (37) we get
Pgit Git + P it  Sit = W it 1 + T it (38)
The rst order conditions are
Git = i 
W it 1 + T
i
t
Pgit
(39)
Sit = (1  i) 
W it 1 + T
i
t
P it
(40)
Now plug (35) and (37) into (39) and (40):
Git = i 
M it
Pgit
(41)
Sit = (1  i) 
M it
P it
(42)
Finally, use equation (37) in period t to obtain equations (9) and (10).
Equation (12) comes directly by plugging (35) into (36).
Appendix 2
The inputs of the calibration procedure are: Real GDP growth rate, GDP
deactor growth rate, population and percentage of workers in the services
sector for all countries (Euro countries and the ten candidates mentioned in
section 6). For all variables we take averages between 1999 and 2003. The
source of all these data is Eurostat.
The calibration procedure is as follows: First, we take directly i as the
percentage of workers in the services sector. Second, using real GDP growth
rate and i, we take the value Ait that replicates the observed GDP growth.
Now, for current Euro area countries we calculate the weights i using popu-
lation. Using them, we obtain the weighted average  At for the EMU. Finally,
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the parameter t is chosen as the one that minimizes the (weighted) sum of
the squares of the di¤erences between the observed ination rates and the
ination predicted by equation (31), for Euro area countries.
In order to study the enlargement, we need to obtain the new weights
for the enlarged monetary union using population of the 22 countries. With
these weights we obtain the new weighted average  At. At this point we can
use again equation (31) to obtain an estimate of the new ination rates (and
the total e¤ect of the enlargement) for the 22 countries.
To isolate the two e¤ects described in section 5 for candidate countries
we construct an intermediate ination estimate by plugging the calibrated
parameter t in equation (20) for each of the candidate countries. This in-
termediate ination tries to estimate the ination rate for the country if
it remains independent but implements the monetary policy of the EMU.
Therefore, the di¤erence between the observed ination rate and the inter-
mediate ination captures the e¤ect of a change in monetary policy, and
the di¤erence between the intermediate and the new estimated ination rate
captures the money attraction e¤ect.
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